Journal of Administration Overseas

Volume XIII/Number 3/July, 1974

Price 32½p quarterly net; annual subscription including postage £1.50

INCLUDING

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by R. M. B. King

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by Diana Conyers

Self-Help Housing in the Seychelles—a Pilot Project
by Andrew C. Harris

BOOK REVIEWS
by Guy Hunter, R. E. Wraith, A. R. G. Prosser, Lord Grey of Naunton, Phyllis Deane, L. W. Norwood, David C. Potter and A. F. Robertson

Published for the Ministry of Overseas Development

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Published by

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Editor's Notes

In this Number we cover a variety of subjects. R. M. B. King presents an overview of the European Community's role in the field of international aid. He does not consider that the community at present follows a "development policy that can be realistically defended as promoting maximum development in the countries of greatest need", and he urges that the community's aid programme should be "the one above all others which is regarded by the outside world as the embodiment of Europe's aid philosophy and policy" – for which he provides forward-looking proposals.

Diana Conyers discusses the novel approach to decentralised development adopted on the Tanganyika mainland of Tanzania, where the traditional ministerial structure has been abolished and emphasis placed on rural development through the concept of the *Ujamaa* village. While the author is perhaps less than fair in her reference to pre-independence developments (e.g. the Co-operative Movement, sleeping sickness control and research, health and maternity clinics, TB and leprosy services, etc., were certainly noteworthy) and while *Ujamaa* villages are not perhaps following quite the voluntary pattern first envisaged, nonetheless here is an exciting experiment, and the philosophy and the reasons for the policies adopted under Dr. Nyerere's stimulating leadership are explained with sympathetic understanding.

Andrew Harris recounts his experience doing voluntary service on a self-help housing project in the Seychelles. He shows how it was possible to get skilled and unskilled Seychellois to join together outside working hours on an unpaid co-operative basis. Permanent low-cost housing units for which a contractor would have charged nearly £1,000, were built at negligible cost and with minimal financial assistance. One feels that a lot of credit for the success achieved so far must be due to the author and his volunteer colleague's sympathetic approach both towards local problems and the local people.

Mary Tiffen provides a case study of successful agricultural development in the Gombe Emirate of North East-Nigeria and concludes that "relatively cheap and simple development policies of providing good administration, good communications and appropriate extension work will probably succeed . . . where there is at least some natural instinct to trade" – as there certainly is in Nigeria, enough indeed to turn the subsistence-level cultivators and herdsmen of Gombe into forward-looking and reasonably prosperous farmers.

Finally P. S. Lamba examines the unsatisfactory condition of Indian municipal government, diagnoses poor State/Municipal relations as a major cause and prescribes a reformed directorate of municipal administration acting as guide, philosopher and friend rather than autocratic controller, as the remedy most needed.

Criteria for Europe's Development Policy to the Third World*

By R. B. M. KING

Mr King is Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Overseas Development.

A Comprehensive Development Policy

The communique issued at the conclusion of the Summit Conference in Paris in October 1972 – two months before Britain's membership of the Community became effective – said "the institutions of the Community and member States are invited progressively to adopt an overall policy of development co-operation on a world-wide scale".

Now, an overall policy of development towards the Third World requires action in the fields both of trade and of aid. The initiative and responsibility for trade relations with developing countries lie essentially with the Community institutions. With aid the reverse is true. The competent authorities are primarily the governments of the member States each of which has an aid programme of its own; the role of the Community institutions is at present a limited one, mainly concerned with aid for associated countries and dependencies, and with food aid.

I would like first to say a few words about trade co-operation. The export earnings of developing countries are of course much more important to them in quantitative terms than aid. Clearly the EEC along with other developed countries must, if it is to pursue a credible overall policy of development co-operation, progressively open its markets to the exports of the Third World. This policy must apply not only to primary products but also to manufactures, where developing countries can exploit their economic advantages of lower labour costs, e.g. textiles and electronic components. Such a policy will of course have certain consequences for the traditional suppliers of these goods from within the Community, and adjustments to the new situation will be required. If the domestic difficulties of such adjustments are to be minimised, this opening of markets can only be done over a period and in a controlled manner. I do not propose therefore to dwell on the trade policy aspects of development co-operation, except to point out that in my view commodity agreements, designed to be fair both to consumer and producer, can be a most important and useful measure in the field of trade co-operation.

*This article is an edited version of an address given by the author on 26 January 1974 at a seminar on "Development Policy and the Policy of the European Community", organised by the Evangelische Akademie, at Bad Boll, West Germany.

The Aid Side of the Coin

Turning to the contribution to development policy of financial and technical co-operation, the first point that confronts a newcomer to the European scene is the sharp difference of approach in regard to the trade and aid sides of the coin. Whereas responsibility for trade matters is centralised, and the policy is comprehensive in the geographical sense and relatively well defined, we find firstly that in matters of Aid, responsibility is fragmented between the European institutions and the member Governments; secondly, that the element of it which is administered by the European institutions is, with the exception of food aid, extremely limited geographically and does not conform to many of the criteria for an ideal policy of financial co-operation; and, thirdly, that very little attempt appears to have been made to co-ordinate or harmonise the member States' bilateral co-operation policies.

It does not seem to me therefore that, whatever may be said on the trade side, Europe has a coherent or credible policy of financial co-operation. What it has is a regional aid fund limited to the Associated countries, plus nine separate bilateral programmes administered by individual member Governments according to their own desires and policies and co-ordinated only in a very general way through the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which is of course a much larger grouping of countries than the Community. I propose therefore to examine the existing arrangements against the background of the general objectives of a truly European policy of financial co-operation, whether that policy be implemented through the Community institutions or through member Governments' bilateral programmes or both.

I intend to approach this question in the following way. First I would like to state what it seems to me ought to be the basic objective of a European policy of financial co-operation. Then set out what I think are the essential features of a developmental approach to the distribution and use of concessional funds – by a developmental approach I mean an approach which seeks to maximise the return on the money spent in terms of achieving development and improving standards of life for those in the Third World whose needs are greatest. I am of course well aware that considerations other than those of a purely developmental character enter into decisions about the allocation and use of concessional funds – there are a number of historical, political, economic and commercial constraints on both donor and recipient Governments. Nevertheless, it seems to me right in this context to start from the standpoint of the developmental approach. Having set out the criteria for such an approach I then intend to assess briefly how the Community programmes and the bilateral programmes of the member countries match up to this approach and, lastly, to put forward some suggestions on how the situation might be improved.

The Developmental Approach

I start with basic objectives. The most important of these, it seems to me, should be to demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that the Community is not a rich man's club looking after its own self-interest without regard

to the well-being of others less fortunate than itself. In fact of course not only would it be morally indefensible to disregard the interests of others but it would be a particularly short-sighted policy since one thing that recent economic history has surely taught us is that prosperity is indivisible; a high level of world trade with all countries sharing in the process of economic growth is the situation most conducive to the economic well-being of developed as well as developing countries.

The avoidance of the impression of Europe as a rich man's club cannot be achieved if the Community pursues purely self-regarding policies and uses aid as a means of furthering narrow political or commercial interests. But it can be achieved if the Community makes it quite clear both by precept and in practice that it is pursuing policies which have proper regard for the problems and legitimate aspirations of the Third World. Given that resources for development are scarce (particularly resources available at concessionary rates) the first requirement is to reach a measure of agreement among the countries of the Community about the principles to be followed in allocating both their bilateral aid and the aid funds channelled through the Community institutions. Aid funds are of course only part, and indeed the smaller part, of the total flow of funds to the developing countries. Commercial funds in the form of export credits, Eurodollar loans and private investment, etc., are also available and are not limited in quantity in the same way as concessional funds. Many (though not all) developing countries can borrow on the commercial market, where the only economic constraints are the cost of borrowing and the impact of that borrowing on their debt servicing capacity.

Nevertheless, it is concessional funds – that is, aid funds – which are my main concern, since it is by the volume and concessionality of such flows that the extent of the help given by the Community countries is measured and judged. Given that these funds are limited they must be treated as a scarce resource by both donors and recipients. Now the essence of the development approach is that concessional funds should be so allocated that they alleviate to the greatest possible extent the poverty of people in poor countries. I submit that this objective – the relief of poverty – is best achieved by ensuring

i. that concessional funds are allocated between countries according to their economic need measured on poverty and population criteria, the funds being allocated broadly on a *per capita* basis with the poorer countries receiving larger *per capita* amounts;

ii. that the poorer the country, the softer should be the terms of the aid, i.e. the greater the degree of concessionality;

iii. that all funds, whatever the degree of concession and whatever the source, should be used effectively – they should be applied to purposes which yield an economic return to society as a whole (as distinct from a more narrow financial return) no less than is expected to accrue from funds used in other sectors; or, as the economists would say, no less than the opportunity cost of capital to the country concerned.

These are the central propositions in a development approach, but they need some consideration and justification.

First, the poverty criterion. Despite its admitted imperfections, no better way of measuring poverty has yet been devised than the basis of national income *per capita*. The justification for using this criterion for the allocation of concessional funds is that countries with the lowest *per capita* income obviously have the furthest to go in raising the living standard of their populations and are the least able either to raise the level of domestic savings or to service commercial loans raised on the market. The function of concessional funds is to enable such countries to retain a higher proportion of the income generated by growth and thus to allow either investment, consumption, or both to grow faster than would otherwise be the case. Hence the need for maximum concessionality for the poorest countries.

The strict application of these criteria to the allocation of concessional funds would involve the greatest amount of funds going to the four very large and very poor countries of Asia – India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia, whose populations comprise 42 per cent of the whole of the developing world and 70 per cent of those in countries with an annual income per head of less than $200. Political constraints obviously loom large here if only because of the existence of relatively large numbers of much smaller poor countries who will demand a slice of the cake.

The ability and willingness of a country to make effective use of funds (absorptive capacity) can also be a constraint on the full application of the *per capita* income criterion. This raises difficult questions of performance which I do not intend to consider now; all I would say is that performance and absorptive capacity can be improved over time given an effective technical assistance policy on the part of the donors and an effective manpower planning policy on the part of the recipient.

So far as the use-of-funds criterion is concerned, the important point is that concessional funds should not be used for investments which yield low rates of return or which provide few benefits. The essential function of concessional funds, I repeat, is to allow a faster rate of development than would otherwise be the case. The opportunity cost of capital (though I admit that this is not always easy to determine) should be the basic guide to the use of all resources, but particularly to the use of concessional funds made available by the donor Governments. This approach does not mean that such funds should only be used for purposes which yield a quantifiable rate of return in financial terms. Both soft and hard funds can be used for non-revenue earning projects as well as revenue-earning projects – that is, for health or education projects, provided that in the considered judgment of the recipient Government (and in the case of concessional funds of the donor Government too) the overall return to society as a whole is high enough.

There are two important operational implications which follow from this – first, concessional funds should normally go to or through the Government of the recipient country concerned and, second, where the project concerned is revenue-earning or is the responsibility of a non-Government organisation in the recipient country appropriate on-lending or two-step lending procedures should be instituted with the on-lending rate of interest at or near the market rate in the country concerned. The first of these will ensure

that the benefit of the concessionality accrues to the Government acting on behalf of all the people of the country; the second helps to ensure that projects whose end-product raises a revenue – for example, electricity generation – but which cannot support an interest rate at least equal to the opportunity cost of capital (and are thus basically uneconomic) are not undertaken.

These then are my criteria for an aid policy based on developmental approach. I will recapitulate them. First, concessional funds should be allocated to recipient countries on a basis of their size and poverty measured by national income per head. The poorest countries should get more *per capita* than the less poor. They should also get a greater degree of concessionality than the less poor. All funds should be used effectively, and there should be appropriate two-step lending procedures for projects which are revenue-earning or which are not undertaken directly by recipient governments.

European Performance

Now how has the EEC measured up to these criteria? First on distribution. Let us define the poorest countries as those with an income per head of less than $200 p.a. This group accounts for 60 per cent of the population of all developing countries. On average over the four years 1969-72 the European Community through its Community institutions devoted 63 per cent of its funds to these countries. Of the individual bilateral donors Belgium gave them 86 per cent of its aid, Denmark 62 per cent, UK 60 per cent, Holland 50 per cent, Germany 42 per cent, Italy 38 per cent, and France 28 per cent. Overall the EEC percentage was 44 per cent.

Now at the other end of the scale let us look at countries with an income per head of over $600 – i.e. those which might be expected most easily to be able to service commercial loans. Over the same period the Community through its institutions devoted 9 per cent of its funds to this group. Denmark gave 1 per cent, Belgium 2 per cent, UK 9 per cent, Germany 17 per cent, Italy 25 per cent, Holland 42 per cent, and France 45 per cent. Overall for the EEC the figure was 26 per cent.

The picture that emerges against this criterion is that the Community taken as a whole shows up pretty badly. Of the bilateral donors Belgium is really the only one which can be said to be following the poverty criterion faithfully. France, and to a lesser extent, Holland (both of whose volume of aid is of course high), are the countries at greatest variance with it. So far as the European Development Fund is concerned it does not operate worldwide, so that its funds are not available to the vast majority of the population of poor countries.

The picture so far as the concessionality of funds is concerned is not a great deal better, though of course this is not as critically important as the allocation of funds. EDF aid is very largely grant, whatever the economic circumstances of the recipient. The implication here is that if the market rate loans available through the European Investment Bank were to be concentrated more in the richer Associated countries there would be a larger share of concessional funds available for the poorer Associates. This is surely a desirable move.

Bilateral donors have quite a wide variety of policies. All the member countries subscribe to the DAC terms recommendations but these are applied in various ways. For instance, the UK gives most of its capital aid on soft loan terms and the degree of concessionality depends on the poverty of the recipient. Most of the loans are in fact interest-free. The UK can therefore be said to be in conformity not only with the DAC but with my terms criterion. On the other hand France, which gives a great deal of its aid in grant form, allocates over one-quarter of it to overseas departments which are an integral part of the metropolitan country with *per capita* incomes of $800-900; most countries other than ex-French Colonies, even when very poor, are offered aid on what can only be described as hard terms. And the Netherlands gives significant quantities of aid to the Antilles on extremely concessional terms even though their *per capita* income is $1,380 p.a.

Quite apart from the fact that considerable amounts of concessionary funds are going to comparatively well-off countries at the expense of the very poor countries, there is thus a clear need for the harmonisation of aid terms to individual countries among the members of EEC and indeed among all donors; this is an aspect of the DAC terms recommendations which should certainly be more closely observed in practice. As the DAC terms resolution recognises, it seems to make little economic sense (and it can also be argued as highly inequitable) for country "A" to provide aid to a certain country on grant or very low interest-free terms and for country "B" to provide aid to the same country on something approaching commercial terms.

Some Policy Changes

I think I have shown that the European Community neither collectively nor individually – though the performance here shows wide variations – has at present a development policy that can be realistically defended as promoting maximum development in the countries of greatest need. This means that whatever other purposes are being served by the taxpayers' funds devoted to this sphere of activity, the return in terms of desirable development is a good deal less than is capable of being achieved. It must surely be a desirable objective to make it good in whole. What then should be done?

One solution would be for all the Community's separate aid programmes (all 10 of them)[1] to be merged into one, administered by the Community institutions along lines indicated by the criteria I have just described. I do not think that such a centralisation is desirable or practicable at the present stage, though it will no doubt be a significant feature of the Community when full political and economic union has been achieved. For the present, however, I think we must accept that there will continue to be 10 programmes. The problem is how to bring them more closely into line both with one another and with the criteria for a sound policy of development co-operation.

[1]The individual programmes of the nine member States and the programme of the Community itself.

I believe that the fundamental issue here is that of geographical allocation. First, it seems to me that the Community's programmes administered through the central institutions should adopt the developmental approach which I have suggested. It is surely *this* aid programme above all others which is regarded by the outside world as the embodiment of Europe's aid philosophy and policy. Yet apart from a programme of food aid (about which I have in any case grave reservations as an instrument of development policy – but that is another story) the entire funds go to a restricted group of countries comprising a mere 4 per cent of the population of the developing world. Even if all the countries now eligible to join the Community (the Associables) do associate, the EDF will still be confined to 10 per cent of the population of the developing world. While fully recognising the need – indeed the commitment – to give priority to the countries that associate with the Community under Protocol 22 of the Treaty, it is surely urgently necessary for the Community to begin to embrace a world-wide aid policy in its multilateral aid-giving activities, as the 1972 October Summit committed the member countries to do. A programme of food aid alone for 90 per cent of the population of developing countries is manifestly inadequate. Yet despite efforts by ourselves and others there is little sign of this wider responsibility being recognised.

Secondly, and still on the subject of geographical allocation of funds, I believe that there is a need for the harmonisation of individual member countries' aid programmes on similar lines. This is necessary not only to be consistent with what I have advocated should be done through central Community institutions but also because it looks towards an ultimate merging of these separate programmes into one European programme. An exchange of information in this respect is not enough. What is required is a deliberate redeployment of funds, on a co-ordinated basis, to the areas of the world where the needs are greatest.

Both the Community and individual donors should base the terms of their aid on the ability of the recipient country to repay. Only under such a regime can one be sure that the most concessional funds go to those who need them most. Country terms should be established in consultation with the country concerned and these should be broadly followed by both the Community aid institutions and the bilateral donors.

On the use of funds the concept of the opportunity cost test for capital investment projects should be universally adopted and appropriate two-step lending procedures introduced generally.

If we can proceed along these lines we shall have taken the essential step towards the formulation of a European development policy that will stand up to the most rigorous examination by the critics; and we shall have forged a powerful instrument for the relief of poverty in those countries where this problem is the most severe.

Course of Perfection

In putting forward a plea for a policy of financial co-operation based on a developmental approach I have been counselling a course of perfection.

I make no apologies for that. I believe that unless one has an objective to strive towards, then one lacks that sense of direction and purpose which is the mainspring of human endeavour. But as that great French writer and philosopher Voltaire once said:

"La perfection marche lentement; il lui faut la main du temps."

"Perfection walks slowly; she needs the hand of time."

It will take time to achieve perfection in this as in most other early activities. My immediate purpose will perhaps have been served if I have been able to show how relatively imperfect our approach to this problem is at the present time. The way ahead, if we are to progress at all towards that state of perfection, will require a change of heart on the part of all of us. I am fully aware of the difficulties; Britain's policies, like those of other countries, have been constrained by historical and other factors, though some countries suffer in this regard more than others. We shall all need to have somewhat less regard to some of these considerations and somewhat more regard for the needs and aspirations of all those countries, and in particular the poorest of them, which are struggling against heavy odds, made so much heavier by the oil crisis, to improve the lot of their people. And indeed if we do that I believe we shall find that the interests of the Third World are identical with our own interests in the long term, both political interests and commercial interests.

We cannot, however, make any advance individually. We must, if we are to succeed, move forward together. This requires, first, agreement on the basic objectives of a European development policy and, secondly, the political will to move towards those objectives. I have tried to indicate what I think these objectives should be. The question is, have we in Europe the political will to achieve them?

Self-Help Housing in the Seychelles—A Pilot Project

By ANDREW C. HARRIS

Andrew Harris was recently an international voluntary service volunteer in the Seychelles.

THE provision of housing of an adequate health and social standard at a low price is a universal problem but is particularly acute in developing countries. There the scarcity of resources clashes with the rapidly-rising expectations to such an extent that improving the housing standard is often carried out at the cost of resources earmarked for the development process. Improving the housing stock increases the social capital of a country but this may be at the expense of establishing a viable economy.

In the Seychelles tourism development has received massive impetus with the opening of an international airport in 1971 and the injection of large sums of aid (in 1972 British Aid alone exceeded £5m in a country with a population of only 53,000). It is estimated that there will have been 12,000 visitors in 1972 and the target for 1986 is 150,000 tourists per year. So in the space of fourteen years the number of tourists expected will increase twelve-fold and more. Undoubtedly this will put further immense strain on the social infrastructure which had already been undergoing considerable change in conjunction with the economic problems which gave rise to the need for tourism development on such a large scale. In this, two key factors, the rapidly-increasing population and rising expectations, are predominant. These, in conjunction with a stagnant agricultural export economy, had precipitated this need for development, overtly through a growing trade deficit.

Thus spending on social capital is urgent in order to mitigate as far as possible the strains deriving from the Seychelles being thrown into the twentieth century. Awareness of this is explicit in the Government giving priority to housing. At the same time finance for this, particularly in the long term, is not unlimited. Again, the building industry is already working to full capacity in construction related to tourism. Finally, compounding the problem, is the fact that while spending on social capital goes some way towards mitigating the strain of accelerated development, the real problem in the social structure is the breakdown of established social and community relationships. Until this problem is solved then the danger of social unrest killing tourism is very real.

The key factors of rapidly increasing population and rising expectations, already mentioned, against the background of tourism development, give the key towards an understanding of the housing problem in the Seychelles.

In the 1960 census it was found that only 10 per cent of houses were of permanent materials (e.g. stone or concrete); in 1967 a survey of Victoria, the main town, showed that only 28 per cent of the 2,040 houses were permanent structures, 31 per cent of the remaining temporary structures were in "fair" condition and 41 per cent were in "poor" condition; in 1970 700 houses in inner Victoria were surveyed to reveal that 26 per cent were "good", 33 per cent were "fair" and 41 per cent "poor" (with an average of 1.5 families living in each "poor" house). The 1970 census has not been fully computed but has initially shown that the number of houses has only grown by 15 per cent since 1960 compared with a population growth of 29 per cent. In other words at least until 1970 house building was not even keeping pace with the increasing population never mind coping with increasing expectations! However, the physical size of the problem should be carefully noted. In 1972, 249 new houses were needed simply to maintain the existing ratio of people to houses. Further, it has already been stated the Seychelles has 53,000 people, i.e. the problem is real but on a small scale compared with a continental nation. Similarly the main island, Mahe, is about 85 square miles, a granitic mass rising to almost 3,000 feet with consequently very little good building land. All this should be borne in mind in the following discussion of a Self-Help House Building Scheme since schemes in other countries are inevitably on a bigger scale.

A variety of approaches to the housing problem offer themselves and indeed a comprehensive solution would have variety as its essence. This is the keynote of the Government's approach. This article reports on the progress of one pilot scheme using Self-Help as its linchpin. The attractions of this scheme present themselves immediately on paper; building is done by the future house owners themselves thus cutting out labour costs and thereby making house ownership (itself highly valued in the Seychelles and intrinsically valuable in so far as it is likely to give rise to desire for political stability) available to a lower income group than would otherwise be possible; building jobs would be done out of standard working hours thereby making little demands on already overstretched construction capacity; beneficiaries of such a scheme would be those who are willing to make an effort on their own behalf (not an attitude sufficiently encouraged in a society where paternalism and master-slave attitudes are still far too prevalent); and above all working in self-help building groups would help towards the re-structuring of community relations.

The biggest doubt raised against the scheme was the simple proposition that the Seychellois were incapable of working together in such self-help groups for the length of time needed to build the houses. This was an attitude which prevailed right through society, from the top of the civil service to the most junior clerk, from the estate worker to the "grand blanc". Indeed, the first men to start on the pilot scheme expressed major doubts themselves; it was presumably the extremity of their own housing situation which led them to try.

The originator of the scheme was D. W. A. Collett, then Adviser on Social Development to the Seychelles Government; and the general form of the scheme was agreed by early 1970. Finance came in the form of a grant of

£27,000 from Overseas Development Administration (ODA) in November 1970 to build a pilot project of fifty houses. A grant, rather than the interest free loan requested, was made presumably to give an opportunity for the scheme to be a continuing one (if it should prove successful) by the use of a revolving fund – repayments on already completed houses paying for material loans to other self-builders. Thus the grant contained the proviso that participants had to pay all costs (including services) connected with the scheme. It was the intention in any case to cost the scheme as effectively as was possible so that this and future schemes could be operated without there being any doubt about where the subsidy, if any, lay. Thus, for instance, allocation in the costings was made for the management of the scheme, although much of the administration would be done by staff already employed by the Seychelles Government. Eight acres of land were put aside in an area called Greenwich, about ten minutes by car and fifteen minutes by foot from the centre of the main town, Victoria. (The land incidentally commanded a magnificent view of the town, port and south of the island). Finally, it was decided that the pilot project should be run by two International Voluntary Service (IVS) volunteers; both arrived in October 1970. One of the volunteers, Bob Hargreaves, held an HND in building and had worked for several years in architects' offices in Bedford, England. His responsibility lay broadly in the technical aspects of the scheme. The other, the writer of this article, had just completed a degree in sociology and economics at the University of Durham, and, using his workcamp experience gained previously with IVS, was responsible for the personnel aspect of the scheme. Whereas these two broad areas of responsibility remained throughout, in practice the volunteers worked very closely together; this seemed particularly important in view of the fact that the pilot scheme threw up such a vast range of problems.

Applications for places in the project were first invited on January 11th 1971 during a broadcast on housing policy by the Minister of Housing, Labour and Social Services (who had taken office just three months previously following the first elections under the new constitution, which gave a variety of government portfolios to five ministers appointed by and from the majority party in the Legislative Assembly). The two months between the approval of the grant and this initial announcement had been spent in preparing and costing a house design, working out selection procedures and selection criteria, and in the survey and preparation of the land.

The survey showed that three acres of the land were immediately unbuildable, being rocky slopes of up to 70°; experience with the first self-help teams showed that a further three acres, although milder in slope, were still too steep for the scheme, given the joint limitations of the lack of mechanisation and the lack of sufficient money for alternative building techniques. To put it another way, it seemed impractical to ask self-builders to construct granite masonry foundation walls of eight, ten or even twelve feet and the money was not available to use different building techniques (for instance, reinforced concrete). Thus only two acres of the eight acres originally allocated turned out to be serviceable and the lack of sufficient alternative land is, now the scheme is established, holding back any faster progress (as will be seen later in this paper).

The first house design used on the scheme was a concrete block structure with concrete floors and an aluminium roof. It consisted of a core house of 500 square feet (divided into a sitting room and two bedrooms, each of 120 square feet) plus an external kitchen, shower, and lavatory unit of 90 square feet set no further than 12 feet from the house. The kitchen itself was 54 square feet. Windows were louvre units and further ventilation was provided by grille blocks. Drainage was to septic tanks and soakaways. The aim was to provide a basic unit of permanent materials which could then be improved by the occupier after he had moved in, as and when he could afford it. Thus the house was designed so as to be readily extendible by at least 250 square feet. Ceilings, too, could be put in at a later date. External finish was pebbling with "Snowcem" and internally the walls were rendered with sand/cement. The cost of materials was estimated at £405. In addition to the cost of materials, participants had to pay for the provision of water and electricity, site preparation, transport, labour and management. This was estimated at £225 per house. The land on which the houses stood was sold at £75 per plot. The total cost then for each house and plot of land was £705. An initial deposit of £75 was required when a participant joined the scheme and the rest of the cost was to be loaned interest free, repayment to start once a self-builder had taken possession of his completed house; repayments were to be completed within 10 years, i.e. monthly repayments of £5.25 were to be made.

It is not unusual to find Seychellois spending a third of their income on rent and to find a quarter of their income spent like this is quite common. Thus the level of repayment set meant that the houses were available to those with a minimum income of about £18.75 per month, i.e. tradesmen government clerk level. Additionally it was not expected that the deposit would be found too high as unutilised savings were likely to be available. Since demand for the houses was expected to be high it was decided to make the houses available to the lowest income group possible; thus it was stipulated that applicants should have an income of between £18.75 and £37.50. Additionally, in view of the fact that the house was extendible, young families with children less than eight years old were to be selected who could derive the greatest benefit from the design by being able to extend their house whenever necessary for the well-being of the family as a whole. Furthermore, applicants would need to be able to cope with the heavy manual work involved and young enough to be able to complete repayment on the house before they were too old to work. Accordingly a maximum age limit was set at forty. It was also decided that the houses would be available only to people already living in town since it was felt undesirable to encourage movement away from rural areas. Finally, nobody who already owned a house or land would be able to join the scheme.

This was the first time that a self-help scheme of this nature had been launched in Seychelles. It had been announced briefly in November 1970, to enable people to prepare deposits. It was, however, important to get across quite clearly to intending builders just what they could expect and what was expected of them. This was provided by the publicity given on the radio and in the government newspaper, through an information sheet supplied with each application form and at the interview which each potential

self-builder attended. Each successful applicant was also visited at his home where any questions which still remained could be discussed and finally before the building started a meeting of each building group discussed all the aspects of the scheme. At a later date, once some building teams were assembled, a short discussion of the scheme between two of the builders already at work was broadcast on the radio aimed particularly at clarifying points which were still unclear. Publicity was also maintained with periodic news items on the progress of the scheme.

The scheme was initially advertised for a fortnight, but further applications were later invited so that effectively people had one month in which to apply for places. This eventually drew eighty-two applicants of whom thirty-six fitted into the selection criteria and were invited for interview. Of these thirty-six, five withdrew and the others were interviewed by a committee consisting of the housing officer, one of the volunteers on the scheme and another member of the department of social development and housing. In addition to the interview, employers of applicants (with the latter's agreement) were seen, to confirm the details given in the application forms and at the interviews. The concern of the selection committee was to make sure an applicant understood the scheme; to select those applicants who most needed a house within the selection criteria agreed; to select those whom it was thought would be the most reliable and would best work together in a group; and to make sure there were adequate building skills represented. In the outcome only two people were rejected because it was thought that either they would not pull their weight or they would not fit in well as members of a team; six others turned out to be outside the selection criteria, and three had working hours which prevented them from attending the scheme fully. (It was felt at least at this early stage, that it would not be possible for people to work at times other than when a whole team was on site since this sort of working pattern is difficult to organise and supervise and too dependent on group trust – particularly when it was not possible to be confident of that trust initially or when morale might perhaps be low). Twenty of the original eighty-two applicants were eventually accepted to join the scheme.

The first building group started work on February 27th, 1971. It consisted of six people; one mason, two carpenters, one medical assistant (who later was promoted to a public health inspector), one mechanic and one taxi driver. Their average age was twenty-nine and among them they had eleven children. They started on the set of understandings which had been stressed throughout the selection process – namely that the group would build a house for each team member of the design described above; that nobody would know which house was for whom until all the houses were finished (when they would be allocated by lot) nor would anyone be allowed to live in a house until all were completed; that everybody had an equal standing in the group (for instance the mason could not expect preferential treatment because he contributed more skill to the scheme than an unskilled person); that whereas anyone could withdraw from the scheme whenever he wished he could expect no compensation at all for work done up to his withdrawal and would only receive his deposit back; that a team member had to do the work himself and attend work at the times the team had agreed – he could bring friends

along to help him and the team but only in exceptional circumstances (such as illness) where the team agreed could he have someone else do his share of the work; that a self-builder could not pass on his commitment to another party; that the Government could dismiss a self-builder if his conduct were seriously threatening the success of the scheme (and after two written warnings had been issued) again with no recognition of work done and only the return of his deposit; and that once a builder had taken possession of his house he would not be allowed to sell or lease the house for ten years. This set of understandings along with the government obligations were to be contained in a legal agreement signed by the team and the government.

The other two teams were scheduled to start in late March and early April but during March, six of the accepted applicants withdrew or asked to take part later for a variety of reasons. One of the main reasons was that they had not been able to raise the £75 deposit. Thus a second team was started on March 27th with seven members of whom three were masons, three were carpenters and one worked in the planning department. (Their average age was thirty-one and they had seventeen children among them.) Thus the second team had a considerably greater proportion of skilled men in it than the first; this presented an interesting opportunity for comparison of how work would progress as well as presenting a potential problem of morale in the first team if the second team's work did progress substantially faster.

The same problem of selected applicants withdrawing presented itself later in the year when further housing was advertised in May. For this application list the set of selection criteria had been extended in the light of experience gained so far. The changes extended the family income range up to around £56.25 a month (with the same base of £18.75), raised the maximum age limit to 45, allowed applicants from anywhere in Mahe, as long as they could show that they could reach the building site when necessary, and dropped any requirements about maximum age of children. The selection committee still intended to go for its "ideal" of the younger families who were badly housed but was enabled by these amendments to diverge from this ideal as and when suitable other cases presented themselves. By June 1st, twenty-seven more applications were received and six of the applicants previously rejected were reconsidered. (Fourteen of the twenty-seven new applicants were interviewed.) Eventually, out of the thirty-three, sixteen were invited to join the scheme, but only three effectively took the chance, and of these three, one had to be asked to withdraw after two months because he rarely turned up for work in a sober state, if at all. In the outcome, three more men joined the team one and a half months after the third team had started work to make that team up to five, consisting of two masons, one carpenter and two taxi drivers. Their average age was twenty-six and each had one child.

Thus, towards the end of 1971 the picture was one of a large number of applicants of whom about half were immediately within the scheme selection criteria only and about one-seventh were willing or able to participate. Clearly this was not a satisfactory state of affairs, and could have derived either from the fact that there was really no demand because there were

easier ways of getting a good standard house (for example on the Government's low rent scheme) or because the scheme was inadequately advertised or because it was incorrectly structured (for example, because the deposit was too high or because people did not like the idea of an estate).

Another possibility was that people still did not believe in the viability of the project. This last possibility was a very real one (as will be seen below) but one which could only be dispelled by the success of the teams already started. Meanwhile, it was felt clear that the deposit of £75 was too high and accordingly it was decided that this should be cut to £37.50 by reducing the cost of the house. This was achieved by cutting the house size by 150 square feet down to 440 square feet. (This was the same size as the houses being built at the time under the Government low-rent housing scheme.) This second type of house had one bedroom of 120 square feet, a divisible living area of 230 square feet, a kitchen and a combined shower and w.c. At the same time the house was again designed to be readily extendible by at least 230 square feet. This then was a very basic unit which incidentally would be easier to build particularly insofar as the house was a single unit, only requiring one set of foundations. Rising material costs absorbed some of the savings on size, but this second type of house was costed at £341.10 for the materials. Total cost, embracing costs for land, management, site preparation, labour, tools, transport, water supply and contingencies was estimated at £603. Thus, with participants paying a £37.50 deposit, monthly repayments for the 10 years repayment period would be £4.725. So not only could the deposit be halved, but the minimum income which participants would be required to have could be cut to £15 p.m. (This coincided with a pay award to unestablished staff in government of up to 40 per cent at the lowest levels; thus it was now possible for a labourer whose wife worked, say as a washerwoman, to join the scheme).

A variety of problems prevented this second type of house getting off the ground until 1972, but a team of eight started in August of that year. The team consisted of three masons, three carpenters, a storekeeper and an electricity linesman. For these houses twenty-seven applications were made, all of whom were interviewed (even though some clearly did not come within the scheme's selection criteria); ten of the applicants were rejected and nine had to be asked to wait until further sites were available. Significantly 1971's experience of people withdrawing their applications was not repeated; furthermore, the proportion of applicants within the criteria was well over 75 per cent, and the proportion of acceptable applicants was 63 per cent.

Clearly by mid-1972 there was a great deal more confidence in the scheme and looking to the future, there seems no reason to doubt that there will be a steady demand. It has been mentioned earlier how little confidence existed at the start, and this is well worth remembering in any assessment of the success of the scheme. Lack of confidence was even quite readily and frequently expressed by the first two teams who started. So not only were there quite major technical problems to be overcome to ensure the scheme's success, there was also the major problem of holding the teams together and maintaining their morale. After a certain amount of experiment, working hours were eventually fixed at fourteen hours a week, ten of these being on

Saturday afternoon and Sunday. It was agreed that the best method of building was for a team to build its set of foundations first, afterwards the shells and roofs. In that way all a team's houses would be finished at roughly the same time. The sites were all on terraced land and presented quite a problem in the foundations because the front foundation walls were as much as six feet above the base of the concrete foundation. It was clear that this would quickly sap enthusiasm and it was initially hoped that major site preparation could be done with a bulldozer. In the outcome plant was not available and the prison department prepared two sites by hand. Thus effectively the only site preparation for most of the housing was the blasting of the numerous rocks which strewed the site. This left the teams to break the rocks down further by fire for use on the retaining walls and to infill rammed red earth as necessary to make up the floor level. Consequently, something like five months was spent by each team on the foundations, which was, to say the least, a soul destroying operation.

As far as possible work organisation was left to the teams themselves; leaders were allowed to emerge naturally. Small groups were deliberately chosen so that each team member would become closely identified with his group; and the volunteers saw their role as encouraging and maintaining a corporate identity for the group. They did this by working with each team in order to win the confidence of the team members as well as to help the work go with a swing. As each team became established it was possible to work less continuously with them but to lend a hand on some major task as necessary. But it was felt absolutely essential that the volunteers should never lose the confidence of the home builders once it was established. In this way it was always possible for rifts within a team to be repaired through the teams' acceptance of intervention by the volunteers. Indeed the volunteers felt that this was virtually their strongest weapon since the only disciplinary action available on the scheme was dismissal. Thus if the building groups were to be held together and not allowed to splinter through petty disputes, communication had always to be maintained. Each team member had always to know that he could talk to the volunteers at any time about anything and had also to trust the volunteers when they approached a team member about something.

Perhaps the greatest problem on site was heavy drinking. Most of the disputes on site stemmed from this and the problem was how to control the amount drunk since it would have been impossible to stop the builders drinking altogether. The heaviest drinking took place when the work was heaviest and least rewarding; this meant that drinking problems occurred most frequently during foundation work when progress was slow anyway. Once this work was completed drinking fell off so that the problem only emerged sporadically. And it is noteworthy that some of the builders who were very heavy drinkers at the start of the scheme now drink very little or not at all. It should be noted, however, that the incidence of heavy drinking varied among teams and team influence could be very useful in reducing the problem (if used carefully).

The other major problem in holding teams together lay in absenteeism; almost invariably those who were absent most were the laziest members

of the team so that the problem was aggravated. Up until September 15th 1972 the picture was as set out in Table 1.

TABLE 1

A = Team
B = No. of team members
C = Total hours worked by team
D = Total man hours
E = Total hours missed by all members
F = E as a percentage of D
G = No. of hours missed by average team member
H = No. of hours missed by worst attender
I = No. of hours missed by best attender

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
1	6	907	5442	341	6%	57	141	10
2	7	819	5733	540	9%	77	183	4
3	5	601	3005	302	10%	60	111	27

Again, apart from the threat of dismissal, the only action open to the volunteers was persuasion and the pressure deriving from the rest of the team. (At times, though, this team pressure had to be controlled as occasionally it went too far and wanted to take its own dismissive action.) The foregoing table is largely self-explanatory and the record is that to date no one has been dismissed from the scheme for bad attendance; one formal written warning has been issued. The one dismissal that has been made has already been referred to in connection with the launching of the third team.

Overall the greatest building problem that the scheme encountered was probably the question of foundations previously mentioned. This taxed morale to a tremendous extent. The writer will not forget for a long time the sense of relief in the second team when their last foundation was finished, for they had the most difficult building sites. Of course the problems were by no means ended once the foundations were completed. Particularly in the case of the second team a great deal of the heavy work involved after that, involved the essentially tedious task of moving materials by hand often for quite some distance. Effective work organisation of course mitigated this to some extent. Perhaps the most frustrating problem though for the self-builders after the foundations were complete, was the frequent shortage of building materials. Naturally there was always work to be done, but when a task had to be left temporarily, enthusiasm which existed for that task was immediately lost. Many of the shortages derived from the pressure of building within the government, but to make these up by purchasing, externally, usually cost much more, often 30 per cent more. Some sort of balance had to be found between holding down external purchases and maintaining morale.

Many of these problems of morale in themselves were not too serious. But when a variety of problems coincided, then of course they became

exaggerated. Thus it was a concrete block shortage at the beginning of October 1971 which precipitated the "strike" which held up work on the scheme for three months. The main issue was the fact that the contract for the scheme between the government and the self-help house builders had not materialised eight months after the first team had started. They felt therefore that there was little assurance about the cost of the houses once they were completed, or even that they were going to get the houses at all! Evidently the scheme was still very much in the public eye and the home builders had to cope with a vast number of rumours sweeping the town about the future of their houses. These rumours must have had quite a disheartening effect. Consequently, once the builders stopped work, no kind of assurances could take the place of the agreement, even though the only people who were losing by the strike, at least on the face of it, were the builders themselves. The agreement eventually materialised in late January and work was immediately resumed, even though the agreement was not actually signed until the middle of April, 1972.

The agreement contained the set of rights and obligations (as previously outlined) pertaining to both parties and also had, as attached Schedules, the form of conveyance and mortgage agreement which the government intended to enter into on completion of the houses. The conveyance contained clauses to the effect that a self-builder could not sub-let or sell his house within ten years without the prior written consent of the government, and that if a builder wished to sell his house before the first ten years had passed, then he would first have to offer the house for sale to the government at a stated price of £930 (the house price plus some recognition of the labour put into the building); should the government not buy after three months, then, along with the outstanding debt, a self-builder would be required to pay interest at 8 per cent on the sum lent by the government up to the time of sale. These clauses are clearly penal with the objective of trying, as far as possible, to prevent people deriving a handsome profit from the use of government interest-free loans.

For undoubtedly the home builders were gaining a major asset by joining the scheme. The level of repayments was for some of the participants merely what they were at present paying in rent. But for all participants, in the context of the sellers market that exists in the Seychelles, the house that they were building is already an asset worth at least twice as much as the cost to themselves. This asset value, however, could be seen as "payment" for the personal effort the builders have made. Indeed it has involved a tremendous commitment by the builders to join the scheme (particularly such a pilot scheme as this one) not the least aspect of the commitment being the apparent length of time taken for the houses to be built (from one or two years).

In fact, the rate of work is at least as high as might be expected from a building contractor. The first team (with one permanent mason and a second helping out) had at the time of writing (October 1972), completed all its six houses. It only remained to pebble finish three of the houses, put in the plumbing, construct three septic tanks, complete the shower units and hang doors, and insert louvre windows. (Internal rendering and painting will be

done by individual builders once they have taken possession.) Taking a 44 hour working week, they reached this stage in 21 working weeks, which is undoubtedly a good pace of work. The second team with its seven members has built its seven houses at roughly the same rate. (It is interesting to note that, whereas it could be argued that their sites were slightly more difficult, they did not make as much advantage of their more numerous skills as might have been expected. This may well have been because one can have too many skilled members and when this happens some of them have to undertake ordinary labouring duties.

Before discussing possible ways of extending the scheme it may be useful to draw together those facets which have been shown to have succeeded up to the time of writing. It has been demonstrated that such a self help scheme is possible in the Seychelles and that given an adequately-structured and attractive scheme, Seychellois are capable of working in co-operative groups towards a given end. Moreover, the houses are being built outside working hours and by unskilled, as well as skilled people, thereby these permanent additions to the housing stock are being made at no cost to the (labour) building capacity of the Seychelles. Home ownership is being made available much lower down the income scale than would normally be possible with new houses. In the case of the second house design, which is available to families with an annual income of £180, a minimum construction price by a contractor would probably be about £975 (65 per cent of material costs for labour and 10 per cent profit mark up) plus £65 for the cost of the land. If interest-free loans were available on the same basis as in the self-help building scheme (given the same criteria for fixing the minimum income level) the lowest income range to which these loans could be available, would be a minimum annual income of £315. Yet this stimulus to home ownership is achieved at the cost of a relatively small input by the government. The direct government participation initially was the two volunteers. Back up services used were in some cases of (one would hope) a once and for all nature such as drafting the legal agreement; those of a continuing nature were principally the provision of building materials; other services used were a kind which would be used by almost any building scheme, public or private, such as the services of the land and planning departments. (More will be said later of the government's direct participation.) The financial input is quite clear since the scheme can be correctly costed and charged fully to the participants. Thus when the government makes the loan interest free, it is quite clear precisely what subsidy is being given to the builders.

Nonetheless without doubt the aspects which struck the volunteers forcibly as the most valuable aspects of the scheme were the effects on participants working together voluntarily in self-help groups. There are even now and always will be arguments on the estate, but there is no doubt that there is and will continue to be a strong organic community. This contrasts forcibly with the experience on some of the new government low-rent housing estates which are facing problems very similar to those on most large new housing estates where large numbers of families which had no previous knowledge of each other, or of each other's background, suddenly

find themselves neighbours in a new and bewildered community. Individually, too, the participants have benefited in varying degrees and in different ways. But each has the pride of his own achievement and self discipline.

It may be argued that the people who have taken part in the scheme to date were probably exceptional people anyway. This is not particularly true and certainly once self-help building is established, more and more people will have the confidence to try it. Undoubtedly the scheme as it is is attractive financially and will always be so in view of the absence of labour costs and profit margins. But in future great care will have to be taken if the scheme is to be kept available as low as it is at present in the income scale. Material costs are inevitably rising with inflation but this increase ought to be matched by rising incomes. Certainly there is little room for reducing material costs unless local materials were to be used; but this would not be acceptable to likely participants. While the scheme caters for families, which is presumably the correct priority, 440 sq. ft. as a "core" is about as small as it is possible to go. The greatest worry about future rises in the cost of the scheme is in the price of the land. This problem is generally a major one in the Seychelles and as land used for future schemes rises in cost it should be clearly grasped that this progressively takes house ownership out of the grasp of more and more people. Once this is clearly recognised then proper policy decisions thereabout can be made. The same argument applies to the question of building density; as the density per acre is reduced so the cost of each plot rises. The point being made is that a self-help building scheme can make house ownership available to lower income groups than would otherwise be possible, because the future home owner bears his own labour costs and profit margins do not exist. Thus, if house ownership is thought desirable (and statements are frequently made that it is) and worth making available at as low an income level as possible, then any subsidy will be proportionately more valuable in any scheme where costs are cut as radically as in the self-help building scheme than in any scheme where the labour costs have to be borne.

Furthermore, in such a scheme direct government participation need not be great. Whatever participation occurs can be easily charged, without difficulty, to participants in the scheme. But obviously good management staff are at a premium. It was the feeling of the two volunteers who started the scheme that the scheme was well on the way to becoming established so that the work pattern was becoming reasonably routine. In such circumstances by employing labour to cope with the collection of materials, two people with suitable training could cope with about thirty houses at any time and ought to have time left for some other work during the week.

Thus the speed at which houses are built under such a scheme should, now the scheme has been going for over one and a half years, be dependent firstly on a proper flow of new housing team operations (which at the present time in Seychelles is dependent on the proper flow of available land), secondly on the rate at which houses can be completed (again partly dependent on land in so far as this affects the rate at which foundations can be completed – the fourth team on a flattish piece of land has now completed eight foundations in three months – and partly dependent on the complexity of design which

it is hoped is now as simple as desirable) and thirdly on the number of staff applied to the scheme.

Such predictions obviously depend on just how groups are started in the future. There is no doubt that the precise organisation of the scheme is very adaptable. For instance among the last set of applicants it was noticeable just how localised applications were. This may indicate that there would be a demand for small groups of self-help house building in many areas. This would be desirable in order to mix self-help building with other types of housing and would be useful in that plots of around an acre or so, which might be too small for government low rent building, could be exploited. Diversifying of sites, would, however, reduce the number of houses whose construction might be supervised at any one time. (Although the word supervision is used it should not of course be forgotten that this is not merely supervision of construction but includes the maintenance of team morale and cohesion.) It might be observed here that in fact (apart from the slightly less intimate atmosphere) a larger group of eight has so far posed no more problems than a group of five and thus there is no indication that groups of ten or twelve would be unmanageable.

Finally there remains the question of financing whatever flow is decided on. Reference was made earlier to the opportunity that a grant from the ODA gave for maintaining a revolving fund. For the pilot scheme does seem to have been successful and has not shown up any major reason why the scheme should not be a continuing one. Thus, once all the funds from ODA have been used, repayments should provide a yearly cash flow of some £2,700. This is enough to finance the building of five houses of the "phase 2" type. Thus, once the level of functioning of the scheme were fixed, the extra capital needed would be the relevant multiple. Thereafter, the only financing needed to maintain the particular level of flow would be a sum to balance the cost increases deriving from inflation (since the loans are interest free and therefore there are no interest earnings to offset cost increases through inflation). Even if the necessary basic capital were not available from the ODA it might be possible to build up funds locally; as the ODA point out, the government land at present being used by the scheme had no other use at the time, i.e. its opportunity cost was nil. Thus, if it were given to the scheme, payments by the scheme participants for the land would supplement the revolving fund. Again the repayments covering the services of government housing staff could be credited to the revolving fund instead of going to general revenue. Undoubtedly these suggestions cut across the general financial practice of the government; indeed, it appears that the idea of a revolving fund itself is not acceptable to the Seychelles government. The observations are merely made, however, as suggestions to ensure the continuation of what appears to the writer to be a valuable scheme, which contributes greatly yet cheaply to social development in the Seychelles. The reader is invited to judge for himself.

DIARY

1970	October	IVS Volunteers arrive in Seychelles
	November	ODA grant finally approved

1971	January	first applications invited for home-builders
	February	first building team starts work
	March	second building team starts work
	August	third building team starts work
	October	builders' strike starts
1972	January	strike ends
	April	agreement between "self-builders" and Seychelles Government signed
	August	fourth building team starts work
	September	Bob Hargreaves departed
	October	Andrew Harris departed

Organisation for Development: The Tanzanian Experience

By DIANA CONYERS

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THE vast amount of literature on "development administration" which has emerged in the last few years indicates an increasing awareness of the inadequacies of colonial organisational structures in countries which are now independent. The fundamental problem is that the colonial systems, which were modelled on European patterns, were designed to keep law and order and maintain the *status quo*, not to generate economic and social development in conditions entirely different from those in Europe. The position has been well summarised by Burke, who writes:

> "But the new African governments are concerned primarily with the creation of new wealth, jobs, and resource exploitation; with expenditure rather than with savings, with disease education rather than with disease control; with a diversified rather than a single crop economy; with unity rather than with divide and rule; with equality rather than with class and caste; with mass rather than with elite education; with infrastructure for purposes of internal development rather than for communication with the metropole; in short, with innovation rather than with conservation. But the inherited ministerial and bureaucratic forms . . . operate approximately as they did before and are essentially conservative."[1]

Yet, in spite of the growing concern, very few developing countries – with the exception of those which have adopted a communist approach to development – have undertaken any radical reorganisation. The majority have merely introduced a series of minor additions and modifications to the original system. Why is this? The most important reasons are probably the high financial and organisational costs of a major government reorganisation and the absence of any well-tested alternative system to copy, other than the communist model, which most nations have been reluctant to adopt, at least in its entirety. To this must be added the inevitable time lag between the realisation of the deficiences of an existing system and the introduction of appropriate remedial measures, plus the fact that in many countries there is still a tendency – although it is less pronounced than in the period im-

[1]Burke, F. G., "Public administration in Africa: the legacy of inherited colonial institutions", *Journal of Comparative Administration*, vol. 1 (1969-70), p. 370.

mediately after independence – to assume that anything that originated in the west is "modern" and thus beneficial to development[2].

One of the few exceptions to this generalisation is Tanzania, which has recently embarked on a significant reorganisation of its administrative and planning systems in an attempt to meet its particular conditions and developmental goals. The reorganisation, which was introduced in July 1972, involves the dissolution of the traditional centralised ministerial structure and the establishment of development authorities at the regional and local levels which are responsible for the co-ordinated planning and execution of most aspects of development in their areas. It thus involves a significant delegation of authority from the centre to the country's eighteen regions and, to a lesser extent, to lower levels in the administrative hierarchy and, for this reason, it is generally referred to as the "decentralisation programme"[3]. In view of its uniqueness it is perhaps worthwhile to examine the Tanzanian experience, partly to see what factors motivated the reorganisation and partly because there may be some lessons which can be applied in other developing nations.

The Tanzanian approach to development

In order to understand the rationale behind the decentralisation programme, it is necessary first to look at the country's approach to development. The concept of "development" has changed radically since the 1950s when Rostow, with his theory of the "take-off into self-sustained growth", introduced the idea that the then underdeveloped countries of the world could, if the necessary conditions could be obtained, become economically "developed"[4]. At that time "development" was conceived purely in the context of economic growth but, during the next fifteen years, the term was gradually broadened to include a complex of economic, social, political and other environmental factors. Moreover, the subject was no longer the concern only of a small group of economists but of a wide range of social and natural scientists, of governments and international agencies and of the general public.

Nevertheless, in spite of the changes in the concept of development which occurred during this period and the increasing attention which it received, the goals of the development process remained much the same. Recently, however, a much more radical change has begun and a new philosophy of development is emerging. The new philosophy differs from earlier approaches in two main ways. Firstly, it recognises that the achievement of political, social or psychological goals may be equally if not more important than

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[2]This attitude was particularly common in the former French colonies; cf. Brierly, T. G., "The evolution of local administration in French-speaking West Africa", *Journal of Administration Overseas*, vol. 5 (1966), pp. 56-70, and Staniland, M., "Colonial government and populist reform: the case of the Ivory Coast", *Journal of Administration Overseas*, vol. 10 (1971), pp. 33-42, 113-26.

[3]Two forms of "decentralisation" – commonly referred to as "deconcentration" and "devolution" – are often distinguished but in Tanzania the distinction seems invalid since the recent reorganisation involves both processes.

[4]Rostow, W. W., "The take-off into self-sustained growth", *The Economic Journal*, March 1956, pp. 25-48.

purely economic aspirations, such as increasing production and income. This is reflected in Castel's definition of development as:

> the process by which powerless people everywhere are freed from all forms of dependency – social-cultural-economic and political – so that they can create a personal sense of history for themselves and thereby express their full potential as human beings[5].

Secondly, the new philosophy disputes the assumption which has been maintained in the past that the development of the Third World should be modelled on the achievements of the developed nations. It questions not only the applicability of this model to conditions in the developing countries but also the desirability of the so-called "developed" societies of the western or soviet nations.

This change in approach is partly a natural outcome of the progressively broader conception of development which was already emerging but there are also other factors involved. One of the most important is the growing dissatisfaction with the earlier approaches to development, especially on the international front, where – in spite of the efforts made in the First Development Decade – the gap between the rich and the poor nations is steadily increasing. Another factor is the growing concern about the "evils" of western society (ranging from pollution to the depersonalisation of society and the oppression of the educational system) which is manifesting itself among a small, but significant, minority of the population of countries like the United States. And finally, the great improvement in communication between China and other parts of the world has awakened in many people the realisation that there may, in fact, be an alternative approach to development to that of either the west or the soviet countries.

At present the new approach is little more than an ideological movement – reflected in the works of writers like Goulet, Illich, Castel and Okpaku[6] – and no developing country has yet attempted to put it into practice. However, since 1967 Tanzania has been moving in this direction and its current development policy probably resembles the new philosophy as closely as that of any developing nation[7].

In February 1967 the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) – the only political party of mainland Tanzania – formulated a twofold policy of *socialism* and *self-reliance*, which was proclaimed in an historic document known as the *Arusha Declaration*[8]. Like other forms of African socialism,

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[5]Castel, H. (ed.), *World Development: an Introductory Reader* (New York, Macmillan, 1971), Introduction, p. xv.

[6]Goulet, D., *The Cruel Choice* (New York, Atheneum, 1971); Illich, I., *Deschooling Society* (Harper & Row, 1972); Castel and Okpaku in Castel, H. (ed.), *World Development, op. cit.*

[7]For details see the writings of President J. K. Nyerere, published as *Freedom and Unity* and *Freedom and Socialism* (Oxford University Press, 1966 and 1968).

[8]TANU, *The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance* (Dar es Salaam, 1967).

the Tanzanian ideology claims to be based on the organisation of the traditional African family and community and it is thus referred to by the Swahili word *ujamaa*, which means "familyhood"*. The aim of *ujamaa* is:

> To build a society in which all members have equal rights and equal opportunities; in which all can live at peace with their neighbours without suffering or imposing injustice, being exploited, or exploiting; and in which all have a gradually-increasing basic level of material welfare before any individual lives in luxury[9].

This is manifested in the emphasis placed on rural development, and – within the rural areas – on the reduction of regional and social inequalities; the imposition of restrictions to control the development of an urban elite; and the encouragement of mass participation in the development process.

The policy of self-reliance means that, at the national level, the country is attempting to minimise its dependence on overseas trade and aid and, where foreign relations are necessary, they are not restricted to any particular national or international power bloc. It also means that, within the country, every community should aim for a high degree of self-sufficiency and should be responsible for a large part of its own development, making use of local resources, labour and initiative.

The outcome of this approach is that Tanzania is attempting to reject many of the conventional goals of development. The attainment of a "western" life style is considered neither feasible nor desirable in Tanzanian conditions and the aim is, therefore, to create a society in which financial income, advanced technical achievement and material goods are relegated in favour of economic and political equality and independence.

Many factors have influenced the Tanzanian approach to development, including its physical structure and natural resource base, its social characteristics, the impact of colonial rule and, in particular, its political organisation under the leadership of Julius Nyerere. It has also been subject to considerable influence from other countries, partly through technical aid programmes before and after independence and partly through cultural and diplomatic exchanges and mere observation of the experiences of other nations. Moreover, because of its policy of non-alignment it has been exposed to a wide variety of societies – western and eastern, developed and less developed – and it has incorporated some elements from each. However, in spite of these influences, it cannot be said that the Tanzanian approach is modelled on that of any other country or countries. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Malecela, recently wrote:

> The concept of "ujamaa" is neither Marxist or Lockeian. It is neither Russian nor Chinese. It is neither European nor Asian. It is African, but above everything else, it is Tanzanian[10].

And this applies to the Tanzanian policy in its entirety.

**In the context of the Ujamaa village the meaning is "brotherly" in the sense of co-operative and communal.*—Ed.

[9]Nyerere, J. K., "Socialism and rural development", in *Freedom and Socialism*, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

[10]Malecela, J. S., "Some issues of development planning in East Africa", *African Review*, vol. 1, no. 3 (January 1972), pp. 1-7.

The organisation of development

Because of Tanzania's unique and, in particular, non-western approach to development the organisational structure which it inherited at independence has proved to be particularly inadequate. During the first decade of independence (1961-71) three major problems emerged:

i. the lack of co-ordination between the various organisational systems involved in development;

ii. the lack of co-ordination within each system, especially between different economic sectors; and

iii. the over-centralisation of the entire organisational structure.

i. Lack of co-ordination between organisational systems

The main responsibility for planning and executing development programmes during the period was divided between four organisational systems: the administration, local government, the political party RANU, and the planning structure. These four systems operated to a large extent autonomously, with the result that it was very difficult to achieve any co-ordinated development. Particular problems occurred in connection with the roles of the party and the planning structure, which in Tanzania, as in the majority of developing countries, play a much more important part in the development process than they do in western economies. Because these systems had relatively little control over, or co-ordination with, the administrative system, the implementation of policies and plans was frequently hampered. Thus it was not uncommon to find three significantly different approaches to, for example, the agricultural development of a particular area – one encouraged by local political leaders, another existing only on paper in the form of the official five-year plan document and the third practised by the agricultural extension officers.

ii. Lack of co-ordination within systems

The second problem was the lack of co-ordination within individual systems, especially those responsible for administration and planning. This was primarily due to the traditional ministerial structure of government, in which the responsibility for different economic sectors was allotted to separate ministries, each operating more or less autonomously in terms of the formulation of policies and programmes and the allocation of finance and manpower within its sphere of influence. This created three problems. Firstly, it was very difficult to plan or implement projects which involved more than one ministry and so one found agricultural projects without transport or marketing facilities, settlement schemes without extension staff or social services, and so on. Secondly, there was very little co-ordination between different projects in the same area and there was no attempt to formulate an overall regional strategy, based on an assessment of the area's development needs and potential; in other words, there was no integrated regional planning. And thirdly, because of the tendency to consider development in sectoral rather than regional terms relatively little attention was given to regional differences in resources and needs, resulting in unbalanced regional development and the accentuation of regional inequalities.

iii. **Over-centralisation**

The third problem was that within each organisational system, and even within the component parts (such as ministries) of each system, the powers of decision-making were highly centralised. This had not always been the case as during much of the colonial period the local provincial or district commissioner was largely responsible for all activities in his area, which he often administered rather like an independent bailiwick[11]. However, as the organisational structure became more complex and the ministerial system evolved, power became increasingly concentrated in the ministerial headquarters in Dar es Salaam, especially after independence, when the desire for national control and planning became much more important. The effects of over-centralisation were to handicap the planning and implementation of local development projects and to alienate the general public from the development process. The people who were making the decisions were out of touch with the local administrators who were responsible for implementing them and with the people who would feel their effects; so plans were often irrelevant to local conditions and needs, there was little control over the implementation, and neither the local officials nor the people themselves felt any strong commitment towards, or involvement in, the development of their areas.

None of these problems were unique to Tanzania and many are, in fact, common complaints in all countries – developed and less developed. For example, lack of co-ordination between different parts of the organisational structure is a constant complaint in most western nations and many of the problems of co-ordination increase as the organisational system becomes more complex. Nevertheless, the Tanzanian experience suggests that the negative effects are accentuated in developing countries and especially in a country which has adopted an approach to development like that of Tanzania.

One reason for this is that the Tanzanian approach emphasises the need for change rather than the maintenance of the *status quo* and, in particular, the role of political ideology and national planning in such a transformation. Consequently, it is especially important that there be close co-ordination between the party, the planning structure and the administrative system.

Another reason is that rural development – which in any developing country is more important than in most parts of the developed world – receives particular attention in Tanzania. In rural areas the need for co-ordination between different ministries is increased because the traditional sectoral divisions, which originated in countries with highly-specialised economic structures, are very blurred and most projects involve more than one sector or ministry. This is particularly true in Tanzania, where the main instrument of rural development is the *ujamaa* village*, a form of voluntary co-operative community in which it is essential that all aspects of development (settlement pattern, agriculture, economic infrastructure, social services, political organisation, and so on) are co-ordinated. Moreover,

[11]Cf. Heussler, R., *British Tanganyika: an Essay and Documents on District Administration* (Duke University Press, 1971).

**See also "Ujamaa Villages", by John Connell, JAO, Vol XI, December* 1972.—Ed.

equally important in rural development is that there be considerable decentralisation of decision-making, since it is virtually impossible for central government departments to have an adequate conception of the needs and problems of every rural community.

Another argument in favour of decentralisation is the emphasis which Tanzania places on the organisation of local development projects, partly as a means of achieving self-reliance and partly because popular participation in the planning and implementation of development is an essential component of the concept of *ujamaa*.

A final reason for the particular problems which have arisen in Tanzania is the need to reduce regional inequalities in economic and social development. The distribution of natural resources within the country is very uneven and during the colonial period significant inequalities emerged because the tendency was to concentrate development in the most productive areas – especially the north-eastern highlands and coastal belt*. These inequalities (which are illustrated by the regional *per capita* income figures given in the table below) were still relatively small when compared with those in many developing countries but they were inconsistent with the new egalitarian policy and by 1967 it became obvious that, unless some deliberate steps were taken to achieve balanced regional development, they would increase. Consequently, it was necessary that more emphasis be placed on regional – as opposed to sectoral – development programmes.

A decade of experimentation

During the first ten years of independence, and especially after the Arusha Declaration when the need for change became more acute, Tanzania – like many other developing nations – introduced a series of additions and modifications to the original organisational system in an attempt to overcome the various problems discussed above[12].

The main changes were designed to strengthen the two relatively weak sections of the organisational structure – the party and the planning system – and to integrate them more closely into the development process. Thus, along with so many African nations Tanzania became a single-party state and, in addition, introduced various constitutional changes to increase the power of TANU officials at all levels of administration and government[13]. A permanent national planning structure was established and a series of increasingly-comprehensive and (in terms of their implementation performance) successful five-year development plans was set in motion[14].

**Had the Government Scheme succeeded agricultural development would have been widespread in other areas.*—Ed.

[12]For full details of these changes see: Conyers, D., *Integration and Decentralisation: the Role of Regional Planning in Tanzania* (University of Sussex, D.Phil. thesis, 1973).

[13]For more details see: Bienen, H., *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development* (Princeton University Press, second edition, 1970).

[14]Tanganyika, *Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development* 1964/65-1969/70 (Dar es Salaam, 1964) and Tanzania, *Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development* 1969/70-1973/74 (Dar es Salaam, 1969-70).

Tanzania: estimated gross regional product *per capita* **1967**
(Tanganyika mainland only)

Region	*GRP per cap. in Shs*[15].
Dar es Salaam	5020
Tanga	695
Kilimanjaro	650
Arusha	615
Morogoro	485
Shinyanga	475
Tabora	450
Iringa	375
Mara	375
Mwanza	375
West Lake	360
Mtwara	360
Dodoma	345
Ruvuma	340
Coast[16]	330
Mbeya	305
Kigoma	300
Singida	255
Mainland Tanzania	515

Source: Tanzania, Ministry of Economic Affairs & Development Planning, *District Data* 1967 (Dar es Salaam, 1968).

Attempts were also made to improve the planning and implementation of development programmes at the sub-national level and to popularise the development process. A hierarchy of local development committees – whose members cut across traditional ministerial lines – was set up; representatives of the planning ministry (known as regional economic secretaries) were posted in the regions; and in the preparation of the national plans particular importance was attached to the incorporation of regional and village plans and the introduction of programmes specifically designed to reduce regional inequalities. The Second Five-Year Plan (1969-74) included a separate volume devoted entirely to regional strategies and the future organisation of regional planning in the country, which – although not as sophisticated as originally intended – was probably unique in the history of African development planning[17].

However, these attempts were relatively unsuccessful compared with the progress that was made in national planning during the period. The development committees and other local planning institutions had very little impact

[15]One Tanzania shilling (Sh.) is equal to US $0.14 or approximately £0.05.
[16]Excluding Dar es Salaam.
[17]Tanzania, *Second Five-Year Plan, op. cit.*, Vol. III Regional Perspectives.

on local development programmes and, in spite of the publication of the special volume of the Second Plan, regional and local planning continued to play a rather insignificant role in the national planning process.

This lack of success can to a large extent be attributed to an acute shortage of manpower, partly because of the small pool of skilled manpower in the country as a whole but also because of the failure to give sufficient priority to regional planning when training and allocating the manpower that was available. Thus, for example, there were never more than eleven regional economic secretaries to staff the country's eighteen regions.

The manpower situation was not, however, the only problem; the other major obstacle was the traditional organisational structure which, because of its extreme compartmentalisation and overcentralisation, defeated any attempt to introduce decentralised or integrated planning. The new institutions, such as the development committees and economic secretaries, had very little power over this traditional structure since they could only act in an advisory capacity and all major decisions – including the allocation of almost all financial resources[18] – were still made by individual ministries.

The basic problem was that Tanzania was trying to graft a new form of planning structure onto a colonial administrative system which was not designed to incorporate any unorthodox type of planning – least of all one which required integration and decentralisation at the regional and local levels. It was the recognition of this fact which finally led to the decision to introduce a complete government reorganisation.

The decentralisation programme

There are two main features of the reorganisation which took place in 1972: the decentralisation of a large part of the responsibility for planning and implementing development programmes and the dissolution of the traditional ministerial structure. The ministries now exist only at the national level, where they are responsible for planning and executing projects of importance to the nation as a whole, such as large-scale industry, higher education, trunk roads and other national infrastructure. Those projects which are primarily of local importance – including most aspects of agricultural and related rural development – are now under locally-based control, although plans have to be approved at the national level and all expenditure must be accounted for by regional officials.

At present the main responsibility below the national level is in the hands of the regional authorities; but it is envisaged that, as skilled manpower becomes more readily available, more power will be given to the country's 64 districts, which constitute the next administrative level, and eventually to the lowest level of the ward or *ujamaa* village.

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[18]The exception to this was the introduction in 1968 of a Regional Development Fund, which allocated a small sum of money annually to each region for funding local development projects. Although the fund accounted for only a very small proportion of total regional development expenditure, it was important as a means of testing the abilities of the regions to manage their own financial affairs.

[19]The information in this section is based on Tanzania press reports and personal communications. The most informative report was published in the *Daily News* of May 17, 1972.

At each sub-national level – region, district and ward (or *ujamaa* village) – the main decision-making bodies are the development committees, whose powers and responsibilities have been greatly increased. The regional and district development committees have executive arms, known as development teams, who are responsible for implementing plans and policies approved by the committees. The teams are composed of the technical officers who were formerly employed by the individual ministries but are now directly responsible to the development committees. Two new posts of regional and district development director have been created to fulfil the joint functions of head of the development teams and secretary of the development committees.

It will be several years before it is possible to evaluate the success of the decentralisation programme. It is inevitable that many problems will be encountered and many mistakes made, especially in the early stages of its implementation, and it will be necessary to introduce many additions and modifications to the original system. The co-ordination of the various regional plans and the reconciliation of regional interests are likely to present particular difficulties and there is a very real danger that, at least in the short run, the rate of national economic growth will suffer. Other problems which may occur are the inability to produce adequate plans at the regional level and the failure to have any significant effect on popular participation in planning, while the familiar shortage of skilled manpower is likely to create further obstacles.

However, to make mistakes is not necessarily bad. Tanzania has never been afraid to experiment, to make mistakes and – most important of all – to admit that it was wrong and try again. When explaining the decentralisation programme Dr. Nyerere emphasised that:

> "Mistakes will certainly be made under this new system. But we will learn from them and we can correct them as we go along. Care is necessary, but a desperate fear of mistakes results only in stagnation"[20].

Moreover, even though problems will occur and mistakes will be made, the new system holds promise of proving a significant improvement over its predecessor. It will hopefully eliminate many of the bottlenecks which have hampered development in the past and, most important of all, it is designed specifically to suit Tanzania's conditions and its particular approach to development. It can no longer be said that the country's administrative system is modelled on that of Britain or of any other nation. The new system has undoubtedly been influenced by experiences in many other parts of the world but, like the country's approach to development, it is nevertheless distinctly Tanzanian.

Implications of the Tanzanian experience

What implications does the Tanzanian experience have for other developing nations? Although it would be foolish to suggest that any country try to adopt the Tanzanian model in its entirety, there are many elements which

[20] Nyerere, J. K., public speech made on May 16, 1972, published in the *Daily News* of May 17, 1972.

could be applied in other countries with similar physical and socio-economic conditions and similar development goals. The approach to regional planning, the abolition of the traditional ministerial structure and the emphasis on local participation are some of the aspects which are likely to be applicable elsewhere.

However, the most important lesson – which may be learned by any country formerly under colonial influence – is the need to redesign its organisational structure to meet its particular development needs and aspirations. It is to be hoped that the Tanzanian example, even if only partially successful, will encourage other countries to be more ambitious and undertake similar experiments.

Economic and Administrative Influences on Successful Agricultural Development: A Nigerian Case Study

By MARY TIFFEN

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IT is often illuminating to look at the history of an outstanding agricultural area to see what factors have in the past led to its rapid development. Because so much is unknown in Africa, and local factors are so important, the interactions between economic and political influences on agricultural decisions can often be understood only by a study in depth of an area small enough to be manageable for research, but large enough to include administrative institutions above the village level. This study centres on two adjacent Emirates of Bauchi Province, Bauchi and Gombe, in the present North Eastern State of Nigeria, to try to determine what it was that made Gombe as compared with Bauchi, a centre of growth.

Distinctive features of Gombe Emirate

Gombe Emirate was not remarkable for its prosperity in the nineteenth century. Indeed, when the British arrived in 1902, its internal organisation had been so riven by dissension and rebellion that it was on the point of collapse. Its population of subsistence-orientated herdsmen and farmers had dwindled to probably less than 120,000. It was infinitely less important than Bauchi Emirate, whose capital, Bauchi town, the British made their provincial headquarters, and which therefore enjoyed most public services earlier than Gombe. Even in 1919, when a degree of order and prosperity had returned, the revenues of Gombe Emirate were £9,000 p.a. as compared with £26,000 p.a. for Bauchi Emirate[1]. What is remarkable about Gombe is its rapid growth since then. Its revenue has increased so much faster than that of Bauchi that by 1968 the difference between their locally-derived incomes had narrowed dramatically, being £304,000 p.a. and £355,000 p.a. respectively[2]. By 1963 the population of Gombe had grown to 630,000[3].

When this survey was made in 1967-68, Gombe Emirate was notable for the rapidity with which cotton production had grown since 1949, for the wide-

[1] *Annual Estimates of Native Authorities and Townships*, 1919.
[2] *Local Government Yearbook*, 1968. Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.
[3] *Administrative Population of Northern Nigeria*, Federal Census Board, Lagos, 1965.

spread use of new farming techniques, including the ox-plough, and for the development of two new commercial towns, Gombe and Kumo, both founded since the First World War. Farmers in three Bauchi villages were interviewed in 1968 to see in what way they differed from those interviewed in sixteen villages in Gombe Emirate; analysis showed that they were much less progressive than even the farmers of northern Gombe, who were themselves unenterprising compared with farmers in southern Gombe, the real centre of growth (Table 1).

TABLE 1: *Location of progressive farmers in* 1967-68

	Southern Gombe per cent	Northern Gombe per cent	3 Bauchi Villages per cent
Percentage of interviewed farmers who*			
Had made 3 or more changes in technique	65.9	21.7	5.6
Owned or hired a plough	72.7	41.7	11.6
Had changed main source of cash income since starting farming	64.3	40.0	13.9
Had acquired 2 or more extra fields since starting farming	38.6	10.0	8.3
Number of interviews ..	132	60	36

*In all cases the sample was deliberately designed to include a large number of old and rich farmers. The percentages relate to the sample, not to the total population of farmers in the area.

What distinctive features does Gombe Emirate, and particularly southern Gombe, have, which might account for this growth?

In terms of natural resource endowment, it shares a similar climate with most of the northern Nigerian savanna. Both north and south Gombe have some soils of above average fertility, yet the south has advanced more rapidly than the north. Soils in Bauchi Emirate are probably similar to the soils of western Gombe[4]. Gombe has no distinctive cultural features. As in most of northern Nigeria, Islam is the religion of the majority and settled Fulani, or tribes with a closely similar cultural outlook, are dominant. The minority tribes in both emirates are not dissimilar. Institutionally, Gombe and Bauchi are both headed by an Emir, in the usual pattern of Native Authority (NA) as established in the former Northern Region. They were divided into districts under district heads, who were responsible for several village areas under village heads. Gombe Emirate was one of the two NAs constituting

[4]*The Land Resources of North East Nigeria*, Land Resources Division Overseas Development Administration, London, 1972, Map 12, rates soils on a scale of I (very fertile) to V (suited only to very limited hand cultivation). The soils of north-eastern and south-eastern Gombe are classified as II and III. The western half of the Emirate, adjacent to Bauchi Emirate, has soils mainly of class IV, with small localised areas of better soils, where the villages are clustered. Unfortunately, a soil survey of Bauchi Emirate has not been completed. From personal observation it seemed similar to western Gombe – i.e. mainly poor soil, with the farmlands clustered on locally better soils.

Gombe Division, for which the district officer Gombe was responsible to the Resident of Bauchi Province. However, this institutional similarity disguised the fact that the local taxation and administrative systems were in practice better adapted to economic growth in Gombe than in Bauchi.

Taxation and local administration as influences on development

To contribute to development, taxes must be neither so oppressive as to remove all incentives, nor so low as to provide inadequate revenue for essential public services. In the nineteenth century, the peasant paid taxes to the Emir via the village head, the fiefholder (the Fulani equivalent of district head) and their respective staffs, who each exacted as much, and passed on as little, as they could. The reform of this system was everywhere one of the first priorities of the British administration. District officers made careful village assessments, allocating tax to each village in proportion to its resources. Within the village, the village head was supposed to allocate tax according to individual wealth, a kind of graded income tax. Village and district heads did not, theoretically, retain any tax for themselves, but were remunerated by a salary. Because of the internal disorganisation of Gombe Emirate in 1902, the Emir and his fiefholders were unable effectively to oppose these reforms. Indeed, successive Emirs concurred in this policy of honest and moderate taxation, for they were anxious to restore their prestige, which had fallen to a low point in the first years of the century, by attracting more people to live under their jurisdiction. This motive was also felt by the district head of Ako, who founded a new clan headquarters, Kumo, in 1920, and who was anxious to maintain his own importance in relation to the Emir. In the 1920's he attracted many new settlers who had been living under oppressive district heads in Bauchi Emirate by offering them land and exemption from taxation. The British were less able to eliminate oppression in strong Emirates, where it was not easy for them to displace strongly-entrenched office-holders[5].

Indeed, taxation in Gombe has come to suffer from the opposite defect of being too low to provide adequate revenue for needed services. After 1939 DOs ceased to give so much time to assessments, and the tax degenerated into a low-level poll tax, which means the wealthier farmers do not contribute to local services as much as they could well afford[6]. All NA services have suffered from this, as it has led to low salaries and loss of trained staff, but it has particularly affected road construction and maintenance. Since 1949, the local road network has been improved so as to carry heavier traffic, but has not been extended. Almost all Village Heads felt in 1968 that their area needed better roads and markets, and lack of roads, as we shall see, was an important factor in the backwardness of some villages.

[5]For illustrations, see R. Heussler, *The British in Northern Nigeria*, OUP, 1968, pp. 35-6 and 48-9, *Provincial Annual Reports, Northern Nigeria*, 1953, for Bauchi and Adamawa, and J. G. M. King, "Mixed Farming in Northern Nigeria", *Empire Journal of Experimental Agriculture*, 7, 1939, p. 287, for the way titled landowners prevented ex-slave tenants from manuring their land and adopting the ox-plough in Zaria.

[6]The Treasurer of Gombe NA told the author in 1968 that villages paid the standard tax (then £2 10s) multiplied by the number of taxpayers. Examination of the registers showed very few wealthy individuals were separately assessed and taxed by the District Head, as the law provided.

The allocation of expenditure between different sections of the community is important to the pattern of development. Though Gombe Emirate was not in 1968 democratic (and indeed, the Emir and district heads had hampered the introduction of elective Councils in the 1950s), its structure was such that rural interest groups were powerful. Important local families controlled the majority of district and village headships, the holders retaining office for life except in the case of gross misbehaviour. This was in contrast with the more centralised Emirates, where the district heads were court appointees, and could be moved from one district to another at the Emir's pleasure. The Council of the Emir of Gombe has always been dominated by his district heads, not by members of the central court and administration, and the Emir has ruled by balancing interests[7]. Similarly, many village heads are in a strong position *vis à vis* their district head. The strength of rural interests has ensured that a fair share of the admittedly inadequate NA services has gone to the rural areas, by contrast with Emirates dominated by central interests, where most funds are expended on the central township. The NA has always pressed the central government for services it saw would benefit villagers, for veterinary services and roads before 1939, for ploughs, more ploughs, rural water supplies and markets after 1945. At the same time it has always sought to build up Gombe and Kumo as marketing centres[8]. We shall see what an important influence the growth of these places as commercial towns has had on local farm-gate prices. The persuasive influence of village and district heads deeply rooted in their own communities, and the example of the Emir, who is himself a large-scale farmer, have also been factors in the success of agricultural extension in a society which accords great respect to its chiefs. Thus Gombe NA has been able to play a constructive developmental role because it has both represented the needs of its people, and provided them with trusted leadership.

Communications, prices and markets in Nigeria

The proportion of the price reigning in Nigerian urban or overseas markets received by a farmer depends mainly on whether he lives near an urban redistribution market, a rural bulking market, or an isolated village market. Urban redistribution markets are both important retail markets, satisfying the consumption needs of the town population, and also wholesale redistribution centres forwarding produce surplus to local needs to other Nigerian towns, to local villages with a food deficit, and to overseas markets. They also distribute manufactured goods to rural bulking markets. The latter are village markets with one or more specialities – e.g. groundnuts, vegetables, cattle, etc., where traders from the urban market regularly collect supplies. Prices in these markets reflect the urban price (less transport costs), which in turn

[7]K. P. Maddocks and D. A. Pott, *Report on Local Government in the Northern Provinces of Nigeria*, Kaduna, 1951. See also M. Perham, *Native Administration in Nigeria*, 1937, p. 114, for the situation then in Zaria and Kano; B. J. Dudley *Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria*, 1968, p. 63 for Kano, and R. Cohen and J. Middleton, *From Tribe to Nation in Africa*, 1970, p. 165, for Bornu; all examples of centralised Emirates.

[8]The Senior Councillor, Gombe NA, told the author in 1968 they were working to make Gombe the commercial and industrial centre of a large area of North Eastern State.

reflects national and international prices. Isolated village markets with no speciality are not visited by urban traders. Prices reflect local supply and demand, as they are cut off by high transport costs from national and international markets[9]. The importance to a farmer of having access to either an urban or a rural bulking market is shown in Table 2. It will be seen that the farmers at Kumo and those near to bulking markets enjoy reasonable terms of trade, whereas the isolated farmer depending on a village market has little incentive to increase production over subsistence needs nor any means to make profits to finance improvements to his farm. Analysis of the interviews in Gombe showed clearly that the degree of progressiveness shown by farmers was strongly related to their marketing facilities.

TABLE 2: *Prices for produce and manufactured goods in markets in or near Gombe Emirate, dry season,* 1962-63

	1	2A	2B	3
Bag of groundnuts	30s	29s	28s	18s
Bottle of kerosene	9d	10d	10d	15d

1 Urban redistribution market (Kumo)
2A Rural bulking market; 15 miles by good road to 1
2B Rural bulking market; 8 miles beyond 2A; road degeneration after 2A
3 Village market; 30 miles beyond 2A by poor road, then some miles by footpath

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit *et al.*, *Road Survey in Northern Nigeria*, mimeo, London, 1964

The status of markets is closely related to communications. An urban redistribution market needs good communications to other Nigerian towns and to surrounding villages. A rural bulking market needs one reasonably-cheap route to an urban market. A new route has a dramatic effect on local prices when it enables an existing rural bulking market to grow into a new urban centre, with its own network of new rural bulking markets. This brings large numbers of once-isolated, subsistence-orientated farmers, within the sphere of influence of national and international prices. The process is linked to the location of administrative centres, both because it was an early priority of the colonial administration to build roads linking the headquarters of provinces, divisions and districts, and these were all potential trade-routes and also because the administrative centre acquired a non-farming population, whose demands for food made its market of greater importance than the average village market. It therefore tended to attract immigrant traders which stimulated commercial development.

Communications, markets, prices and production in Gombe Emirate

The opening in 1939 of a direct road to Jos, the centre of the tin mining area, was a turning-point in Gombe's economic development, as it provided

[9]This description of the organisation of markets is based on The Economist Intelligence Unit *et al.*, *Road Survey in Northern Nigeria*, London, 1964; E. H. Gilbert, *Staple Food Marketing in Kano Province*, Ph.D. thesis, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 1969; and W. O. Jones, "The Structure of Staple Food Marketing in Nigeria as revealed by Price Analysis", *Food Research Institute Studies in Agricultural Economics, Trade and Development*, VII, 2, 1968, pp. 95-123.

relatively-cheap all-season access to Jos and all the other Nigerian towns and ports connected thereto by road and rail. Nevertheless, the cost of moving a ton of grain from Gombe to Jos in 1940, still exceeded the current retail price of grain in Jos market. However, increased employment in the army, the mines and the towns led to constantly-rising grain prices, which only finally levelled out at nine times the pre-1939 price during 1958-65. By 1942 it was profitable to sell Gombe corn in Jos, and as prices rose, so more and more Gombe farmers began producing food surplus to their own needs. By 1955 they were sending over 30,000 tons p.a. towards Jos. Cattle prices also rose[10]. In 1951 the Marketing Board raised its prices for groundnuts. Competition between traders who were supplying other Nigerian towns by lorry meant that farm-gate prices for groundnuts were often above official levels.[11] The British Cotton Ginning Association (BCGA) began buying cotton in Gombe after the opening of the 1939 road, when cotton fetched about 1d per lb, but until 1948 it was unable to compete with the rising prices offered by local weavers, whose trade flourished while the 1939-45 war curtailed cloth imports. In 1948 the Cotton Marketing Board was established and offered a standard price of 4d per lb at all cotton markets, raising this to 6d per lb in 1950-51. At this price cotton production in Gombe was very profitable, and more and more land was cleared and planted with cotton[12].

The rising price of so many farm products brought larger rural incomes and increased demand for consumer goods and services. This led to an inflow of traders and artisans into Gombe and Kumo towns. Gombe town grew from 3,000 in 1931 to 18,000 in 1952 and to 47,000 by 1963. This created a local urban demand for foodstuffs, resulting not only in still higher farm-gate prices, but also in the upgrading of many village markets to rural bulking status as traders used all available roads to seek supplies for the towns. The enterprise of farmers in southern Gombe, shown in Table 1, is associated with the high prices they receive due to the many rural bulking markets serving the two towns in their area. Farmers in northern Gombe may get the standard cotton price set by the Marketing Board, but at one of the principal northern markets, 70 miles from Gombe town, they only get half as much for their grain as farmers nearer the town. Bauchi town has never become a major marketing centre and has little influence on local village prices.

Marketing Board prices and cotton production

The remarkably-rapid expansion of cotton production and plough farming in Gombe Emirate since 1949 (illustrated in Tables 3 and 4) has been contemporaneous with government control of the marketing and price of cotton through the Marketing Board already mentioned. As local weaving went into decline, *c.* 1948, with the resumption of cloth imports, the price offered by the Marketing Board became the ruling cotton price in Gombe. (This was not the case with the other marketing board crop, groundnuts,

[10]M. Tiffen, *The Enterprising Peasant*, Overseas Development Administration, London, 1972, pp. 145-8, gives evidence for these price movements and the trade in foodstuffs.

[11]Economist Intelligence Unit, *op. cit.*, p. 116, and a leading Gombe trader.

[12]"Cotton in Gombe", *Newsletter*, Ministry of Agriculture, Kaduna, Jan. 1959.

where internal demand continued to have a strong influence on actual prices). We can therefore trace the relationship between the board's price and cotton production, and assess the Board's contribution to agricultural development.

The Marketing Board maintained the cotton price at or near 6d per lb from 1951-52 to 1960-61. From 1961-62 to 1967-68 the price varied annually, the average price being only 4.9d per lb. From 1968-69 the price returned to 6d per lb (Table 3). Sales to the Marketing Board rose from 250 tons in 1948-49 to an average 15,000 tons p.a. around 1960. During the subsequent period of lower prices, production per taxpayer virtually ceased to grow (Table 3, last column). The rate of annual increase in production rose again when the price rose in 1968-69.

TABLE 3: *Cotton prices, increases in production and number of taxpayers*

Period	Average cotton price per lb in pence	Production 3 year average* in tons	Average annual percentage increase in production	Average annual increase, numbers of taxpayers	Average annual increase in production per taxpayer
1951 to 1960	5.9	(1951-53) 3,584 (1959-61) 15,258	19.8	2.7	16.7
1961 to 1967	4.9	(1965-67) 17,276	2.8	1.6	0.4
1968 to 1970		(1968-70) 25,789	14.1	0.8	13.4

*Three year average of sales to the Marketing Board are taken to even out annual variations in production due to climatic factors.

CALCULATED FROM:
Marketing Board prices for Gombe less Produce Sales Tax, tonnages purchased at Cotton Markets in Gombe Emirate, recorded by Produce Inspection Division, and annual taxpayer totals, supplied by Gombe N.A.

TABLE 4: *Cotton prices and rates of investment in land ploughs and oxen*

Period*	Cotton price, pence per lb	Number of new ploughs	Average annual no. of new ploughs	Estimated average cost, plough and oxen	Estimated cost of clearing 10 acres	Total investment in land and equipment
1947-51	4.0	600	100	£30	£75	£63,000
1952-60	5.9	3,400	377	£40	£80	£408,000
1961-67	4.9	1,000	143	£45	£90	£135,000
Total		5,000				£606,000

*These periods are not quite the same as those in Table II, because of the necessity of using years in which the Agricultural Department had attempted a count of ploughs. Their figures have been rounded up slightly to allow for ploughs they almost certainly missed.

SOURCE OF ESTIMATES

Plough and oxen:

1947-60 Scattered references to prices of ploughs and oxen;

1961-67 Prices mentioned by farmers interviewed in 1967.

Land clearance:

1947-51 Estimate from wage rate known to be paid by farmers clearing new land in Gombe, 1951.

1952-60 J. R. W. Marshall, "Land Acquisition for the Bornu Railway Extension", *Journal of Local Administration Overseas*, October 1963, states the average cost of compensating Gombe farmers in 1958-61, was £83-84 for ten acres, based on the local cost of clearing new land, and local average costs of buying land.

1961-67 I assume some rise in costs, but allow for the average farmer's costs being considerably below the £150 paid for hand clearing 10 acres at a new cotton plantation in Gombe in 1967, quoted in G. B. Jones and C. Harkness, *Visit to Proposed Cotton Plantation, Gongola Valley, March* 27, 1968. Report for the Institute for Agricultural Research, Ahmadu Bello University, 1968.

The steady high price of the 1950s gave Gombe farmers the incentive and the means to invest in new production facilities. They worked harder, hired non-family labour, invested in new labour-saving equipment such as the ox-plough and enlarged their farms by clearing more bush. The close relationship between Marketing Board cotton prices and the rate of investment in ploughs and land is shown in Table 4. The average annual number of new ploughs acquired fell off sharply in the period of low cotton prices, 1961-67, as compared with the 1950s.

The profitability of cotton farming also induced many farmers from poorer areas to migrate to Gombe, where there was vacant land suitable for cotton. NA tax records show that immigration was high during the 1950s, falling about two years after the drop in cotton prices, presumably due to the delay in transmitting information to the provinces of Sokoto and Katsina, some four hundred miles away, from which most of the immigrants came. Each immigrant farmer spent about £150 in direct labour, savings and reinvested profits in establishing a hoe-tilled farm in Gombe, and about £250 if he eventually acquired a plough and a bigger farm. Part of the increased production of cotton and foodstuffs in the Emirate since 1950 is due to the arrival of these immigrants who converted bushland into farms.

While Marketing Board prices were sufficiently high in the 1950s to stimulate investment in increased production for a profitable crop, they were not as high, especially in the early fifties, as was feasible in view of reigning world prices. Although a small proportion of the marketing board's surpluses was used to maintain prices 1958-63, over the whole period 1950-66, £3.8 million was withheld from cotton farmers[13]. As Gombe farmers were pro-

[13]Calculated from H. C. Kriesel, *Cotton Marketing in Nigeria*, NISER, Ibadan, 1968, Table 9, pp. 60-61.

ducing about 10 per cent of the Nigerian crop, their "loss" was about £400,000. If they had received this sum, and invested only 10 per cent of it, £40,000, they could have purchased an extra 333 ploughs and cleared an extra 3,330 acres. They might then have realised an extra £33,000 p.a. in cotton sales, at an average yield in southern Gombe of 400 lbs per acre, when the price was 6d per lb. When the commercial price was over 6d per lb they would have made still more, and these attractive returns would almost certainly have induced the investment of more than 10 per cent of the extra income. The additional cotton production would have generated more government revenue from a reasonable level of produce sales tax, export duties, and import and excise duties on consumption goods. This might well have been enough to compensate for the loss of marketing board surpluses, and could have financed the research, extension, feeder roads, markets, etc., which were being provided out of part of those surpluses. It is thus likely that the Marketing Board's pricing policy depressed investment and production.

Extension policies

During the 1920s the Agricultural Department worked out a new type of farming based on the ox-plough and the use of farmyard manure. The manure was thought essential to prevent the degradation of the larger area which the plough would enable the farmer to cultivate. Loans were available for farmers to buy ploughs and oxen. This extension package was offered in the 1930s to farmers of several areas, including those in Bauchi Emirate, as staff allowed[14]. It spread rather slowly, and in 1945 there were still only 2,400 "mixed farmers" in Northern Nigeria[15]. The introduction of the system in Gombe Emirate had been deliberately delayed until the 1939 road should bring both better prices and the possibility of better supervision, and was delayed again till 1946 by the 1939-45 war.

Gombe farmers, who had access to plenty of fertile, unused land, but who lacked the labour to till it, quickly perceived that the plough would enable them to grow extra cotton and grains, and to benefit from rising prices. They put down deposits for their ploughs and produced their own oxen for training in such numbers as to embarrass the Agricultural Department, which was short of staff to supervise the use of manure. The Gombe farmer was not interested in making farmyard manure; he was clearing virgin bush and maintaining fertility satisfactorily on older fields by kraaling and other traditional methods. The Department was so exasperated by the failure to use manure that in 1952 it ordered the NAs of four areas, including Gombe, to stop issuing loans. This was intended to confine plough farming to the number of farmers who could be supervised[16]. However, at this stage the Department lost control over the supply of ploughs. European stores began selling them over the counter; Nigerian traders scoured the north for

[14]King, *op. cit.*, pp. 271-298.

[15]Food and Agriculture Organisation, *Agricultural Development in Nigeria*, 1965-80, Rome, 1966, p. 202.

[16]*Report on Mixed Farming Conditions*, 1952, Dep. Ag. 7119, and *Production Development Board*, Dep. Ag. 283, Nigerian National Archives, Kaduna.

secondhand ploughs to sell in Gombe markets and local blacksmiths learnt how to make them. Consequently, as we have seen in Table 4, the rate of acquisition of new ploughs could not be held in check. However, the department gave little further help to the new plough farmers. This was unfortunate, as farmers had real problems in handling the plough, and caring for the oxen. They needed other ox-drawn implements such as a cart and weeder, which were not available, as almost no research was done on these problems[17].

The Department had switched most of its research and extension effort into cotton and groundnut cultivation. The emphasis on cotton suited the needs of Gombe farmers, where some soils were particularly well suited to the crop, where yields even with traditional cultivation methods were higher than the Nigerian average, and where cotton therefore gave very good returns per man hour of labour input. Mr. A. M. Krzywon was stationed in Gombe as Cotton Seed Multiplication Officer from 1952 to 1959 to organise seed distribution and marketing and to teach improved methods of cultivation in connection with a programme for multiplying improved varieties of seed developed at the Agricultural Research Station at Samaru. The supply of improved seed was steadily increased each year, though in the 1950s it was deliberately rationed to ensure that farmers maintained food production. Krzywon's brief allowed him to spend much time in the villages and his long tenure of office enabled him to build up good relationships with district and village heads and the local farmers[18]. His work made an impact still visible in 1967-68, when most farmers still followed his advice to rotate crops and to plant early. He had also encouraged them to invest in a plough, realising that this helped secure good ridging and early planting. It can be calculated that, very roughly, 20 per cent of the increased cotton production between 1950 and 1960 was due to the input of improved seed; 30 per cent was due to better cultivation techniques as a result of extension work and the use of the plough, and 50 per cent was due to increased inputs of land, with complementary labour[19]. This is an example of the success of extension work when it is devoted to a crop profitable in local circumstances, and is carried out continuously over a period of years.

Because extension had already been so successful, Gombe was selected in 1964 for a USAID pilot project to explore the effectiveness of using many more junior extension staff and of teaching new methods through "package demonstrations". A demonstration plot was sited on the land of a co-operating farmer, who was given all the necessary inputs of seed, seed-dressing, fertiliser, etc., and who carried out recommended spacing and planting techniques under supervision, watched by his neighbours. The project resulted in much greater sales of fertiliser and seed-dressing and widespread adoption of new crop spacings. Once again the programme was suited to the needs of farmers in southern Gombe, where immigration and

[17] A. M. Krzywon, Cotton Seed Multiplication Officer, *Monthly Reports*, 1952-57, Institute for Agricultural Research, Zaria, often referred to these problems.

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] These calculations are based on the known variety and quantity of seed distributed each year in Gombe, no seed being left unused in the dumps till 1963, and known purchases at cotton markets in Gombe Emirate. See Tiffen, *op. cit.*, p. 182-5.

the expansion of farm size had by this time led to a shortage of farmland, falling fertility, and a felt need to improve yields.

Differences in the duration and suitability of extension work probably account for some of the difference between north and south Gombe (Table 1). The most progressive district is Ako, followed by the rest of southern Gombe. Ako was chosen for the introduction of plough farming in 1946, the cotton programme in 1952 and the package demonstrations in 1964. The programmes were subsequently extended to the rest of southern Gombe and then, with much thinner coverage, to northern Gombe. One of the two districts of northern Gombe could not benefit from cotton extension because of unsuitable soils. Farmers in one of the sampled villages in Bauchi had had extension advice intermittently since 1936, but the general marketing situation was poorer, and there may have been socio-political constraints on investment (such as oppression of obviously-wealthy farmers).

Credit schemes and private investment

A continuing preoccupation of the Agricultural Department has been the need for credit to enable the farmer to buy new inputs, such as ploughs, fertiliser, etc. (Farmers actually use credit, obtained from friends, moneylenders or traders, mainly to hire labour). The mixed farming advances were probably useful in the 1930s, when produce prices were low and unstable. However, when prices are rising farmers need less credit. Only about one-fifth of the ploughs in use in Gombe in 1967 had been originally bought with a loan, and many of the ploughs financed by advances 1946-52 could have been purchased for cash had this been allowed then. Farmers were buying oxen, which were more expensive than the plough, from their own resources, which showed credit was not essential. New loans were banned 1952-60, partly because of the supervisory problem, and partly because the accounts of some NAs (not Gombe) were in disarray through corruption or inefficiency with large sums outstanding under Advances. Yet these years saw the most rapid expansion of plough farming, through the reinvestment of farming profits.

A second attempt to make credit available was through the Co-operative movement, launched in Gombe in 1959. The last survivor of the 70 societies at one time on the books was closed down in 1968. All the others had been unable to repay advances, either because the funds were used to recruit farmers to a political party – farmers often thought they had received a gift, not a loan – or because senior members embezzled funds, or because of genuine difficulties through lower than expected cotton prices.

The willingness of farmers in northern Nigeria to invest varies. Farmers in Bauchi villages in 1967-68, where farming was still based on the hoe and family labour, did not feel the need for working capital experienced by larger farmers in Gombe. A 1958 investigation found that the use of loans for productive purposes was associated with plough farming and that 42 per cent of private loans made to southern Gombe farmers were used for farm inputs,

compared with 17 per cent in the rest of the four provinces investigated[20]. It seems possible that it would be wiser for Governments to try to create the conditions in which farmers are willing to invest their own money – non-oppressive local government, better prices and the availability of rewarding new inputs – than to provide credit where there are not the resources to guarantee its honest administration.

The sequence of development

We can now summarise the sequence of development in Gombe. First came a reform of local government institutions and taxation, providing an atmosphere in which enterprise was not inhibited and which attracted immigrants, both farmers and traders. Secondly, improved communications gave access to more markets and led to higher farm-gate prices. Gombe was fortunate that this coincided with, and was reinforced by, rising national and international prices for farm produce in the 1940s and 1950s. This gave farmers the means and the incentive to invest in improved production facilities. The necessary new inputs and new knowledge were at the same time provided by agricultural research and extension. The two major constraints on still greater increases in production have been the depression of farm prices through the policy of "taxation" through marketing board surpluses, and the failure to expand the revenues of the local authority in step with increasing prosperity, which has led to poor local government salaries, loss of trained staff, increasing inefficiency and a failure to provide essential local services, such as more village roads. This has meant that some farmers are still isolated from profitable markets.

Conclusion

This case-study demonstrates that Nigerian farmers are enterprising, and will invest in new production facilities and adopt new methods under the stimulus of good prices. They will even move hundreds of miles to establish a new farm if they foresee this will give them a better living. The importance of good prices is now generally recognised and in January 1973 the Federal Government announced its intention to limit taxation on export crops and to fix marketing board prices in the light of world prices. Secondly, the study shows how cheaper communications build up new marketing centres and bring more farmers within the range of prices reigning in urban markets. Thirdly, it shows that extension succeeds with peasant farmers, provided it takes account of local conditions of land shortage or labour shortage, and is concerned with crops which, in local circumstances, give farmers the best return for their labour. Fourthly taxation must both allow sufficient incentive for the farmer and provide adequate revenue for essential infrastructure and desirable amenities. The local government unit plays a particularly important role as collector of taxes, interpreter of local needs, and administrator of vital development aids such as village roads, markets, rural water supplies, etc. Administrators at state and central level, therefore, need to pay constant attention to building up the efficiency of the local unit,

[20]A. H. S. Vigo, *A Survey of Agricultural Credit in the Northern Provinces of Nigeria*, Ministry of Social Welfare and Co-operatives, Kaduna, 1958, p. 17.

to seeing it is truly representing the needs of its people, and that it is neither oppressive nor corruptly administering scarce community resources. This is another need already recognised in Nigeria, where several steps have been taken recently to improve the efficiency and representativeness of local governments.

The relatively cheap and simple development policies of providing good administration, good communications and appropriate extension work will probably succeed in all societies where there is at least some natural instinct to trade, and where there are some traders ready to activate new trade routes. If such policies succeeded in rousing the very isolated, mainly subsistence-orientated farmers and herdsmen who inhabited Gombe Emirate 1900–1940, there is hope that they can succeed with similar communities elsewhere. Difficulties are most likely to arise in those areas where the cost of transport to markets, internal or external, cannot easily be reduced, and where, in consequence, men may find it more profitable to migrate to sell their labour elsewhere than to farm at home.

Pathology of State Control over Municipal Administration in India: A Prognosis

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UNDER the Constitution of India, responsibility for local government lies with the State government, which has the powers to determine the structure, functions and financial resources of its municipal authorities*. For historical reasons, municipal government has yet to flourish in India as a self-reliant and virile institution, and in spite of sporadic attempts substantially to disentangle it from the state government and its field agencies, the laws and administrative practices have remained as unimaginative and static as ever. State governments, in general, have continued to play a rather negative role, restricting the initiative, discretion or assumption of responsibility on the part of the urban local bodies. The laws enacted so far with regard to State-municipal relations have failed to provide a local planning and administrative machinery capable of executing functions assigned to municipal bodies in approved development Plans. Today the State-municipal relationship in India more, perhaps, than in any other country needs to be critically examined in the context of the national commitment to planned development – economic, social and cultural.

State control over municipal bodies takes three forms: legislative, judicial and administrative. The legislature and the courts, however, only come into the picture occasionally, the former when a new law has to be enacted or an old law amended and the latter when any action of the government or the municipal authority is challenged on legal grounds. These two forms of control "are old and exercised by bodies not exclusively concerned with the affairs of local authorities not instituted primarily to consider their problems. The remaining form is new and has been expressly created for this one purpose"[1]. It is the executive government only that has to deal with the municipal authorities regularly in their day-to-day administration. Accordingly, it is to the control exercised by the state government with its executive powers that attention has primarily to be directed in this short study.

Administrative control: There is no aspect of municipal administration which does not come within the range of administrative control. Municipal Acts are replete with powers accorded to State Governments over the various

**In some States the elected body for a Municipality is called a "Council", in others a "Committee". For the sake of uniformity "Council" is used throughout this article.*—Ed.

[1]William O. Hart: *Introduction to the Law of Local Government and Administration*, London, 1957, p. 277.

branches of the urban authorities. Chapters dealing with control provide a very comprehensive list of the over-riding powers held by State Governments and reflect a basic mistrust of municipal autonomy. The Municipal Account Codes (enacted by the State Legislature) and the Rules (issued by the local government department under powers vested in the Minister) have been so designed as to leave little initiative with the municipal authorities. This form of government control, in the absence of any agency to provide timely guidance and assistance, has meant in practice that the municipal Council is held responsible not only for mistakes committed in its collective capacity, but also for those committed by the President or the Executive Officer[2]. The elected representatives of the people are unable to bring into full play local participation and initiative because of the mass of controls, checks and counter-checks which hedge municipal government activity. As the Local Government (Urban) Enquiry Committee observed, "It is inconsistent to combine universal adult suffrage and autonomy for government, both at the centre and in the state with any high degree of regulation, control and interference in local government institutions"[3].

Techniques of Administrative Control: The techniques of administrative control are outdated, unimaginative and largely negative. Some of them are, of course, indirect and less rigorous, such as giving directions, making rules and regulations, inspecting municipal institutions and property, calling for information and reports, etc. But many other controls are more drastic and take the form of suspension of resolutions and orders; refusal to approve the election of a president, a vice-president or members of a Council; or the removal of such duly elected persons; prior approval of local actions before they may be taken or resolutions before they can be implemented; the approval of appointments, the confirmation of byelaws and the supersession of municipal councils.

Financial Control: In the field of municipal finance, too, State control[1] is so detailed that there is hardly any scope for self-government left with the urban authorities. They have to obtain government sanction for all unspecified petty items of expenditure or for undertaking minor works. This places a severe limitation on the financial autonomy of municipal councils and is incompatible with the principle of wider autonomy for self-governing institutions. In the name of financial propriety and vigilance the Local Audit Department seems to have so demoralised many municipal councillors through fear of being surcharged they have ceased taking any active interest in public affairs. The budgets of the municipal councils are subject to the sanction of the prescribed State authority, The imposition, exemption, abolition, suspension or reduction of taxes, the investment of municipal funds in government or other securities, the application of municipal funds beyond the limits of the municipality; the raising of loans and holding cash reserves in the bank – in all these matters approval of the State Government is necessary. Such rigid controls tend to stifle local initiative, delay action and retard the healthy growth of civic responsibility.

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[1] *AIR* (1960) 2 *All.* 539.

[2] Report of the Local Government (Urban) Enquiry Committee, Government of Punjab, 1957, p. 41.

The State Government hardly ever exercises the comprehensive powers it possesses to act in cases where municipalities default on their legal obligations. The municipalities are allowed to make mistakes and they go on making them till maladministration results in gross neglect of duty or abuse of powers, calling for the drastic measure of supersession. On supersession of a council, the municipal councillors including the president and the vice-president have to vacate their seats and their functions are performed by an administrator appointed by the State Government. Yet supersession of a municipal council means the supersession of the people's rights of self-governance at local level, since a municipal council is as much representative of its area as the State legislature is of the State as a whole.

In India, State Governments have frequently resorted to the supersession of municipal councils. The view that, if a municipal council abuses its powers or is considered incompetent to perform its functions, it should be superseded is mistaken. As Maheshwari so aptly puts it: "Mankind has not yet contrived and cannot ever contrive a fool-proof legislature or, for that matter, any human organisation. If that were so, the judiciary would not have declared so many state and even parliamentary acts *ultra vires* the constitution. The decisions of the High Courts are sometimes rescinded by the Supreme Court. Many actions of the bureaucrats who, as a class, tend to regard themselves as the acme of wisdom and uprightness, happen to invite the wrath of the judiciary"[4].

A municipal council, duly elected by the freely-expressed choice of the people, should not be superseded on unsubstantiated charges of incompetence or abuse of powers. In practice, alas, these councils are all too often superseded for political reasons. Municipal councils in which the interests of the party in power are safely looked after escape regulatory action even if they are in a worse state of administration than those which get superseded. That supersession of municipal councils is often on political grounds is amply seen in the fact that judicial decisions in many cases have gone against the State Governments where the matter has been tested in the Courts. The municipal councils are, moreover, kept under supersession for inordinately long periods. There are some municipal councils which were superseded as long ago as in 1966. Since then, the State Governments have taken no steps to hold elections or to restore the democratic working of these bodies. Sometimes, it would seem the delay in restoring local self-government has been deliberately to suit the political convenience of the party in power.

Nor is supersession of municipal councils a satisfactory remedy for the maladies from which they suffer. Their incompetence in performing their functions is largely the result of the faulty structure which places constraints on the smooth working of municipal bodies. The weaknesses of this structure include the absence of a strong and independent executive; undue interference by the elected members in executive matters; inefficient and unqualified municipal personnel; inadequate resources; losses due to improper

[4]Shriram Maheswari: *Local Government in India*, New Delhi, 1971, pp. 318-319. See also Civil Writ No 70 of 1967, *Punjab Law Reports*, Vol. LXX, 1968, p. 276, whereby the principle of *audi alteram partem* prevailed.

assessment and collection of taxes and wasteful expenditure. Unless these defects are removed through structural changes a municipal council cannot be expected to perform its duties efficiently and effectively. It is on such changes that attention needs to be focussed. Supersession, particularly where this is politically motivated, provides no real answer to the problems of urban local government.

Control Mechanism: Unlike other departments of the government, the Local Government Department in many States has no field agency of its own to provide guidance and assistance to municipal bodies in the solution of the problems. The department, organised as it is, is hardly equipped to play the role of a friend and adviser. It lacks expert knowledge since all the officers are drawn from the State Executive Service and the Indian Administrative Service. The principle of "linked experience" is overdone; frequent transfers do not allow time enough for any officer to acquire experience, and to collate and digest what he has learnt. As a result, there have developed neither techniques and methods of collecting data and information in a systematic and meaningful manner nor a positive approach to promoting the best interests of municipal authorities. Apart from routine work, the activities of the Local Government Department are generally confined to entertaining complaints, to considering the removal of elected members and office-holders and to the supersession of municipal bodies. This type of control is negative in nature. It can punish the corrupt, but it cannot foster initiative or improve the efficiency of work in urban local bodies.

In the absence of any departmental organisation, the deputy commissioners and the sub-divisional officers are utilised as the chief agents of supervision and control. These administrative officers of the State Government have no special training for the supervision and guidance of municipal bodies. "It must be admitted", remarks Strickland, "that . . . the district officers and others who advise and control (local) authorities have less knowledge of local administration in principle and practice than is desirable"[5]. Besides, these officers, because of their multifarious duties pertaining to revenue, development, and general administration, have no time to guide and assist municipal authorities over their problems. It is only the most important and controversial matters that receive their personal attention. Generally they leave everything to be managed by the Local Fund Clerk/Assistant attached to their office. This leads to an unimaginative handling of the problems of municipal committees and allows scope for undesirable manoeuvring by municipal personnel.

Senior administrative officers do not always take a detached view of municipal problems and controversies. Their general duties bring them into close personal contact with leading members of the public towards whom they form their own attitudes, sympathetic or otherwise as the case may be. When they come to deal with these same leaders on municipal bodies they do not always find it easy to free themselves completely from any bias.

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[5]Blunt, Sir Edward, (Ed.), *Social Services in India*, London, 1939, p. 366.

Re-orientation of the Pattern of State Administrative Control

If local bodies like municipalities are desirable as units of self-government, there is certainly no need for an excessive degree of central control. Administrative control should not be confined to dictation by the State but rather to the healthy provision of helpful service, technical advice and enlightened co-operation. The conception of government's role should change from that of a controller to that of an adviser, guide, counsellor and protector.

The interests of municipal bodies and State Government are so closely inter-related that a high degree of co-ordination and co-operation between them is necessary, as both aim at securing the best possible and most efficient service for the people. The state-municipal relationship should, therefore, no longer to be conceived in terms of local autonomy versus State powers. According to the Committee on State-Local Relations, U.S.A. (1946), the optimal relationship would be to strengthen the local bodies so as to enable them to tackle their day-to-day problems promptly and to provide public and other services efficiently and effectively under the supervision of State control[6]. This relationship, according to the Committee, can be achieved if the State (i) bestows greater powers on local bodies, (ii) provides stable and adequate revenues, (iii) exercises flexible administrative supervision and (iv) fosters the enlargement and consolidation of local government. What that Committee has said for the United States of America holds good for India as well.

Controls should be reduced in number and rationalised by working out model bye-laws, regulations and budgetary patterns[7]. Municipal authorities should be left free to frame their budgets subject to certain conditions. Copies of the budget should be sent to a Director of Municipal Administration (the concept of this directorate is explained in the next chapter). The director should intervene only if the budget is inconsistent with the conditions laid down. The sanction of individual works within the budget should be left to the municipal authorities and only major projects requiring higher technical scrutiny need go to the technical section of the directorate. Although the necessity for the imposition of certain conditions cannot be denied, there are too many restrictions attached to grants and loans at present with the result that municipal bodies are very frequently unable to draw and utilise them in time. Therefore, there is a great need for rationalising conditions and simplifying procedures for grants-in-aid and loans[8].

Dissolution: State Government, should relinquish the power to supersede municipal councils. It would suffice were there provision for their dissolution in the event of substantiated complaints of gross mal-administration. Dissolution is a less drastic step than supersession. Dissolution means cutting short the life of an offending council and ordering fresh elections. It is thus a sort of appeal to the electorate to return better representatives than the

[6]Report of the Committee on State Local Relations, U.S.A., 1946 (Published by the Council of State Governments) Summary Report, Part I, Introduction, para. 4 and 5.

[7]Report of the Rural-Urban Relationship Committee, Government of India, Ministry of Health and Family Planning, 1966, Vol. I, p. 117.

[8]*Ibid.*

previous ones. This will have "a more salutory effect on the elected representatives in the council who would have to undergo expense and strain of another election as well as face the dissatisfied local citizens"[9].

But even the power of dissolution should be held in reserve and used rarely as a last resort after all means of advice and persuasion have been exhausted. Appropriate standards and well thought out criteria should be laid down which should apply equally to all municipal committees. Further, the dissolution of a municipal council should take place only with the approval of the State Legislature.

Directorate of Municipal Administration

The State Governments can fulfil their role effectively only if they have a well-organised Directorate of Municipal Administration with a regional inspectorate to supervise, advise and guide municipal authorities. The directorate[10] without its field organisation is apt to remain an ineffective proposition. A well-trained and effective inspectorate is the characteristic instrument for overseeing local authorities in England where there are inspectors of local bodies in the fields of education, highways, fire brigade services and the like, establishing direct links between the local authorities and the departments of central government. The inspection involves the principle that guidance and supervision should be based on knowledge of local conditions. As observed by Prof. Finer, "Contact through inspectors has the outstanding merit of flexibility and manifold adaptability"[11]. The inspector "Can see both sides of the case with empathy – if he is properly selected – and represent the situation of the one to the other, and re-correct each other's impressions of intentions and motives. This assists in getting things done with the maximum of persuasion, the reduction of coercion, the best adaptation of measures to purposes and the improvement of morale"[12].

With a body of inspectors for scrutinising the work of municipal authorities and keeping the State Government in touch with their special needs, difficulties and grievances, the directorate would serve as a source of information for both State and municipal officials. The director and the inspectors should function as friends and guides of the problem-ridden municipal authorities. The image of the directorate in the eyes of municipal authorities that "it is their friend, philosopher and guide and will advocate their interests with the State Government, is apt to suffer in practice if the formal role of the directorate is envisaged as a controlling authority with powers to regulate and restrict their activities and to bring them to book if things go awry"[13].

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[9]Report of the Seminar on Municipal Government in India, Punjab University, Chandigarh, 1966, p. 21.

[10]Full-fledged Directorates of Municipal Administration exist in only six States – Andra Pradesh, Gujarat, Kerala, Maharashtra, Punjab and Rajasthan, but consideration is being given to their establishment in at least five other States.

[11]Finer, H.: *English Local Government*, 1950, p. 325.

[12]Finer, H., in Foreword, Harris, John S., *British Government, Inspection*, 1955.

[13]Bhattacharya, M.: *State Directorates of Municipal Administration*, IIPA, New Delhi, 1970, p. 32.

The directorate should be headed by an officer of the rank of a senior deputy commissioner well versed in the affairs of municipal bodies. A recent committee[14] recommended that, apart from an inspectorate at the field level, a directorate should have:

a. a personnel section to control and regulate the State cadres of municipal personnel and advise municipal authorities about personnel management and training,

b. a planning and finance section to guide and assist urban authorities in preparing their five-year plans in a uniform pattern as part of the State plans. This section should ensure necessary liaison between functional and technical departments of government in planning and execution of their programmes in the urban areas. It will also collect data, analyse information, prepare monographs and circulate them among the local bodies,

c. a central valuation section to guide and control the work of valuation officers and to act as the appellate authority for the valuation of property,

d. a section under the direct control of the director to give general direction and to exercise supervision over the working of local bodies. This section should also undertake the work of drafting bye-laws and rules and advise the State Government on changes needed in the law relating to urban local authorities.

The Rural-Urban Relationship Committee did not envisage the formation of technical "cells" within the directorate. However, it would seem best were an engineering section also created within the directorate for the execution of water supply and sewerage schemes introduced by municipal councils. In many states, the work of underground sewerage and water supply is, at present, being looked after by the Public Works Department under the charge of a secretary. In practice there is great difficulty in co-ordinating the work of the PWD and that of the Local Government Department. The procedure is that municipal committees are required to deposit with the Public Works Department the cash to cover the estimated cost of the scheme, even before the work is undertaken by the Department. Thus, lakhs and lakhs of rupees sanctioned for municipal work has remained on deposit with the PWD while the actual work would not be taken up for execution for years. A Public Works Department, no doubt understandably, tends to give preference to its own works even against urgent jobs sanctioned by municipal committees. As a result, the councils are burdened with the payment of interest charges. Moreover, they have to pay centage charges[15]. It should be possible with the amount which is actually paid by municipal councils as centage charges, to create an independent engineering cell within

[14]Report at the Rural-Urban Relationship Committee, *op. cit.* pp. 120-121. The recommendations of the Committee, made in 1966, have not so far been incorporated by any State Government in the legislation establishing a Directorate.

[15]"Centage Charges" – a fee charged by the PWD over and above the actual cost for investigation work, preparation and execution of schemes relating to public health and public works.

the directorate of municipal administration exclusively for the execution of municipal works.

Directorate and Local Government Department: At the Secretariat level there is no separate department for municipal bodies. Municipal administration is one of the responsibilities of a combined department of public health, housing, education, etc., under the charge of a common secretary. The town planning department whose work is mostly related to the town planning schemes of municipal bodies is under the charge of a separate secretary. Close co-operation and co-ordination between the town planning department and the local government department is absolutely necessary in the interest of expeditious and smooth preparation and implementation of the town planning schemes of municipal bodies. This can only be ensured by placing the town planning department and the local government department under the charge of a common secretary. It would seem reasonable to urge that education, which is not a municipal function in States like Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, etc., should be excised from the responsibilities of the local government department.

To avoid unnecessary delays and duplication of work, the director of municipal administration should be made an ex-officio deputy-secretary in the local government department. This arrangement would greatly facilitate the work of the directorate through quick authentication of government orders, ready access to the Minister, speedy movement of files and, in general, easy communication between the secretariat and the directorate, and it would be economical as well[16]. Once a properly designed Directorate comes into existence to perform supervisory and guidance functions, then municipal councils will have a real chance to become self-reliant and useful organs of local government.

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[16]See in this connection, Bhattacharya, M.: *State Directorates of Municipal Administration*, New Delhi, 1970, p. 25.

Book Reviews

Efficiency versus Distribution in East African Co-operatives – A study in Organisational Conflicts, by GORAN HYDEN; *East African Literature Bureau,* 1973.

This is a high-quality book by an able and experienced scholar. At the theoretical level it is a study of the sociology of Co-operatives, in relation to a political and social background, and in particular a study of the conflict between the *concept* of Co-operatives, as it has grown up from the Rochdale model and as it has been perceived by East African governments, and the actual pattern of behaviour and values within East African society. This conflict is illustrated, throughout the main bulk of the book, by description of actual performance, particularly stressing management.

The whole centre of the book is detailed, perceptive, well documented by extensive field work, excellent in presentation and most valuable. It contains a history of the Co-operative movement in East Africa and an indication of problems; a first-rate chapter on the economic and social environment; two long sections on management at Union and Primary level; a section on the relation of Government to Co-operatives (and *vice versa*); and a section on the Nordic Co-operative Project in Kenya. The last section contains a comparison of Kenya (the main focus of the book) with Uganda and Tanzania, "some Theoretical Implications" and "some Practical Implementations".

The main theoretical parts of the book (the Introduction and part of the last section) seem to me to fall somewhat below the general level. This is not because the points made are not both valid and important. It is because there is some falling off in clarity and conciseness, and in the force of the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. A good deal of this is due to the introduction of various chunks of sociological theory from other writers (I suppose, a concession to academic rules) which are in themselves unedifying and jargonish, and which are also unnecessary. For, when the author forgets them, he is perfectly capable of stating the theory much more clearly in his own words, and of illustrating it satisfactorily from his own material.

The basis of the theory, stated in the Introduction, lies in a conflict between a type of organisation based on traditional and persisting social relationships at the grass-roots and the type of relationship demanded by the Co-operative concept, which is based on collaboration of individuals, stripped of their family or sub-group setting, in their common role of farmers, sellers of produce, users of credit. Dr. Hyden borrows from Durkheim two words to describe these two types of relationship – "mechanical" organisation to describe the traditional social pattern based on lineage and patronage, and "organic" for the type of role-based economic organisation. These two words seem very unfortunate, since the traditional organisation is, presumably,

organic to African society, while the role-based organisation is a construct, reflecting new (un-traditional) economic relationships, alien in origin. One might say that jargon does not matter, as long as its meaning is clear and held constant, and Dr. Hyden keeps it so. But this reversal of meaning does seem to blunt the impact of Dr. Hyden's major argument, upon which the whole book hangs – i.e. that co-operatives, with their organisational imperatives, are being imposed upon an existing cultural organism which in fact rejects the Co-operative imperatives and substitutes its own, with highly-disruptive results. This contrast is beautifully brought out where Dr. Hyden contrasts the success of "self-help" organisations, based on small groups, under competitive local leaders, each trying to outdo the other, obeying the group loyalties which have grown up naturally within African society. To call such groups "mechanical" when they are so patently spontaneous emanations from the social organism as it actually lives and works, seems particularly perverse (which does not matter) and be-fogging (which does).

A second jargon word, also borrowed, is "de-bureaucratisation". This refers to the same issue. Co-operative management requires bureaucratic rules to govern the behaviour of the *individual* members in relation to the achievement of their "common" goals. But the members refuse to behave as individuals; they behave as members of competing smaller groups; their goals are not common but competitive as *between* sub-groups and common only *within* them. So they "de-bureaucratise".

The author brings out very well, from a different angle, the same conflict between the official, government theory of what Co-operatives should be and should do, and the way in which their members see them. Co-operatives say African-socialist governments, are a means of preventing class formation and undue gaps between rich and poor: they are a means of participation, *auto-gestion*, avoiding bureaucratic rule. But as to the first point, Dr. Hyden points out that Kenya Africans do not really disapprove of some people getting richer – "the sense that the success of the rich man deprives someone else does not exist in this situation". What Africans do demand, and largely get, is that the leader who gets richer should secure real benefits for his followers/clients; and this is how leadership is constituted; for failure to reward supporters means that supporters will fall away and attach themselves to a more rewarding and effective patron. "What is strong is primary-group consciousness, not class consciousness".

As to bureaucracy, the attempt to insist on bureaucratic rules, in order to operate the "organic" (*sic*) management system has resulted in increased, and still increasing bureaucratic intervention by the Co-operative Department. "Why not abolish the Committees and let the Department run the Societies?" asked a Committee member, furious at constant intervention by Government. There is, of course, a large number of bigger bureaucracies – the Marketing and other Boards. And, in a revealing phrase, Dr. Hyden observes that the Co-operatives are "caught between politically powerful Boards and locally popular self-help societies".

The intervention of the Nordic Technical Assistance Group (45-50 expatriates) follows a forseeable path. Anxious to succeed, highly motivated

and hard working, the Nordic group quickly began to move from advice to execution, doing the jobs efficiently from sheer frustration, and sometimes forced to choose between supporting the Department against the Societies, or *vice versa*. For an expenditure of K£2.25 million, they made some improvement in performance, but could not, of course, solve the fundamental sociological problem.

What, then, is the general picture? An attempt by African governments to insist on a type of organisation (with its implied ideals of equality) which was not acceptable to Africans, or consonant with their current motivation and social grouping, and which had a Rule-Book which they did not understand and were not either trained or inclined to operate. Put into practice, this attempt produced a whole number of symptoms of misfit – management failure, more insistent bureaucratic control, conflict between leaders and officials, suspicion of Unions by Societies, rich-man leadership, and much more. If the author had accepted more wholeheartedly the fundamental misfit between government ideals and actual social behaviour, the final "Practical Implications", which at present are marginal, might have been much more decisively put. It is always difficult to say, *tout court*, "Co-operatives usually fail" – for there are some notable successes (Kilimanjaro coffee, Mwanza cotton and several more). Most of these successes have been focussed on a major cash crop, for which efficient wholesale processing and marketing is available, through a monopoly channel; and many have had vigorous and long-lasting Government managerial support. But the sociological clash, so well brought out by the author, remains a major disease in the whole system, only conquered in exceptionally favourable circumstances. Even where the bureaucratic-organic system shows signs of being learned, as Dr. Hyden suggests, it is among the Kikuyu, in contrast with Luo, Luhya, Kisii and Kamba, he hints that the successful farmers might prefer to compete commercially than to continue support of a fractious Co-operative.

Perhaps it would be true to say that Kenya Africans at least see more opportunities in their own competitive, sub-group patronage system than they do in Co-operatives, partly because there have been plenty of opportunities for the enterprising, and because they have *not* been faced with an unbreakable barrier of exploitation, as the Rochdale pioneers were, and therefore have not been forced, in desperation, to combine. It was the barrier of the Asian ginners in Mwanza that precipitated that particular Co-operative development.

I would hope that Dr. Hyden will soon produce a more definitive set of criteria, by which the suitability of the Co-operative tool of action, in relation to the social pattern, the stage of sophistication, and the crop and marketing environment (Boards, merchants, etc.), can be judged. So much hangs on the success of farmer organisation that it is too late to be making formal bows to Co-operative principles and tinkering with the detailed rules. If, in local circumstances, something is radically wrong, radical alternatives are needed.

GUY HUNTER

The Price of Liberty: Personality and Politics in Colonial Nigeria, by KENNETH W. J. POST and GEORGE D. JENKINS; *Cambridge University Press;* pp. 451; £8.00.

The meaning of the title is not self-evident, and although the sub-title is a little more illuminating, it is as well to say at once that the proper description would be *The Life and Times of Adegoke Adelabu.* The authors describe it as biography, though they have not bothered with biography as an art form but have woven the political history of Ibadan, the Western Region and the Federation, in that order, round the life of a particular individual. Some of this history is narrated with a skill and a flow which professional historians might envy, and much of it, since the authors had access to Adelabu's private papers, breaks new ground. Admittedly, some of this ground could be left untrodden without any great feeling of deprivation, especially that which is concerned with the hour-by-hour, blow-by-blow description of comings and goings, intrigues and counter-intrigues, of the murky politics of Ibadan; but this is perhaps churlish, since the authors clearly believe in micro-history and it is impossible not to admire the way in which they have soaked themselves in the streets, the compounds, the families, the customs and the history of Ibadan City. Elsewhere, and notably when we learn facts about the 1957 London Constitutional Conference which would otherwise have remained closed until 1987, we are indisputably in their debt.

Few people outside Nigeria have heard of Adegoke Adelabu. He was (except for a single *annus mirabilus* in 1955) a minor politician, with a gift for making a mess of his career. A chip on the shoulder because of his lack of education, a chronic inability to remain solvent, a Walter Mittyish approach to life and a total lack of *gravitas* prevented him from staying on the heights to which he briefly rose, and after being bowed out of high office in ignominious circumstances, he never really recovered, in spite of a unique resilience and optimism which kept him trying long after others who had suffered his afflications would have given up. He was somewhat in the doldrums, as Leader of the Opposition in the West – though busily planning a come-back which he believed would lead him to mastery of the Region – when the curtain came down with appalling suddenness in a gruesome car crash on the Lagos-Ibadan road.

Stated thus, the facts hardly seem to rate a biography of 450 pages at a price of £8 But the authors knew what they were at, for Adelabu can be presented in very different terms from those employed above. He was a greatly-gifted demagogue – "the uncrowned king of the streets of Ibadan". He was master of a peculiar kind of English, the extravagant – often ludicrous – use of which could not disguise an acute intelligence and a wide, undisciplined reading. He was a thorn in the flesh of expatriate administrators but the object of their reluctant admiration, while the last expatriate Town Clerk of Ibadan (who was Irish) believed that he could have been a supremely-successful city boss and would gladly have gone on standing at his side. When he died the atmosphere in Western Nigeria was electric and ugly, and there were violent consequences. Even in his absurd moments, which were

many, he was magnetic, and to encounter him was always stimulating. And he was at the centre of events in the vital run-up to Nigerian independence, on which this book throws light.

Having failed to make the grade, in no very creditable circumstances, in the Co-operative Department and the U.A.C., he set his sights on the Administrative Secretaryship of Ibadan, towards which he worked his way with industry, effrontery and charm and few visible means of support. He never achieved this ambition, but by a somewhat different route he did achieve the political mastery of the City as Chairman of the Council under the ultimate banner of the N.C.N.C. But in the mid-1950s political leaders in Nigeria were a small stage army, and Adelabu (tragically in the opinion of this reviewer) allowed ambition to take him to Lagos as one of the Western Regional members of the Federal Council of Ministers. The authors dwell on his immense power as political master of Ibadan and Federal Minister of Natural Resources, but do not sufficiently dwell on the manifest absurdity of anyone trying to do the two jobs. Admittedly the municipal functions of the city, as the expression is commonly understood, need not have been burdensome, as the revenues and staff of the Council were, and are, miniscule in relation to its obvious task; but the pure, disembodied politics of the place, which always aroused more interest than the drains, called for someone who would never be absent if he wished to survive. Not only was he unable to attend to his minimal responsibilities in both places at once, but he got into various kinds of trouble in Ibadan, culminating in the Nicholson Report which criticised his lack of integrity and administrative incompetence. The Governor-General virtually asked for his resignation from the Council of Ministers, and his career started on its descent.

A man who flashed across the Nigerian political skies like a bright comet has given rise to a painstaking and scholarly book. In criticism, the authors belong to the school of political scientists who believe that nothing is too trivial for attention and that it is a solecism for scholars to make moral judgements. This is difficult when the subject of study is what they horridly call the dialectic of the decolonisation process, an important part of which is the adjustment between the moral and ethical assumptions of the colonial power and the subject people. The authors throw little light on this. For example, they chide the Governor-General, in a nicely-written passage combining grace and acidity, for expecting Adelabu to adopt the moral posture of the British élite. They do not actually say, though by inference they think, that there was no reason why the object of the Nicholson Report's criticism should not continue to be a Nigerian Federal Minister. What they do say, practically in terms, is that in the decolonisation process the British were forcing their own institutions and underlying assumptions on unwilling Africans, but this is surely a superficial view. In those days, to suggest that an institution and its surrounding conventions should be other than British, was to draw upon oneself the accusation from Nigerians of discrimination and contempt. Residents and others who were bold enough to suggest that traditional Yoruba democracy was perhaps more appropriate than traditional Westminster democracy, may not have improved their standing in the eyes of the Colonial Office, which was attached to West-

minster democracy, but they were positively abused by Nigerian politicians. All this is now rather meaningless, perhaps, but at the time it was a very real and interesting issue, and one which one would have liked to have heard discussed both more sensitively and more scientifically.

But the sincerity and the humanity of the authors is usually impressive. They admired Adelabu, got to know his family with affection, and with great industry and devotion set themselves to erect a worthy memorial, to a unique Nigerian.

The book ends thus:

> He is dead, and he has no other memorials than this book, with all its limitations, and his children, to whom it is dedicated.

It is a considerable book, and an imaginative choice of subject.

R. E. WRAITH

Dependence and Opportunity: Political Change in Ahafo, Written by JOHN DUNN and A. F. ROBERTSON; Edited by J. R. GOODY; *Cambridge University Press.* Price £6.50. 400 pages.

Messrs. John Dunn and A. F. Robertson have produced a book that presents an immense problem to any would-be reviewer. There are 400 pages of material, beautifully written, rigorously researched, and spiced throughout with a wry sense of humour. There is no padding whatsoever, and the elegant flow of the narrative rivets the reader to each page.

In the space afforded for a review it is only possible to pick out parts of the book which are of absorbing personal interest to the reviewer, though one must hasten to add that all chapters and sub-chapters contain matters of intense interest which are vividly and clearly presented.

The historical development of Ahafo is dealt with in detail, and the subtle economic and political links with Ashanti well illustrated.

In the historical development very naturally the District Commissioner and the Chiefs of Ahafo figure prominently, and one can almost see them as they go about their business in the soft green light of the oldest forest in the world.

The British DC appears as a rather bumbling creature who has designated his role as a father figure and as one who seeks to play that role within a culture of which he is dimly aware. Apt quotations are taken from district diaries and handing-over notes to illustrate attitudes, the level of communication achieved, and the political constraints that surrounded the stranger who would be a father.

There is nothing to deny, but plenty to argue about in the picture presented as the narrative develops. For example, the "social distance" equation of the DC's residence in terms of local population. There were other factors, particularly in the early days, as well as prestige. One remembers vividly

visiting the Methodist Teacher Training College at Akwapim where, around the walls of the Commonroom were arranged photographs of every Principal of the Teacher Training College. The photographs themselves prove an indicator of the health risks of the period. In the early days of the College's existence, around 1906 and onwards, there are few European Principals who managed to survive a complete twelve months in the area that was then designated "The White Man's Grave". As one walks around the photographs on display the period of tenure in the office of Principal before death intervenes gets longer and longer and one associates with this the general movement that did take place away from the village community to healthier surroundings. Surely this was equally true of the DC in Ahafo? Prestige might have been enhanced by social distance, but social distance as a health measure was an imperative.

Of outstanding interest to me is Chapter 5 "Chiefship and The Community". I spent very many pleasant hours with Nana Affori Atta II discussing the role of the Paramount Chief, his Wing Chiefs and other subordinates, in the complex administrative and political machine that he controlled as Paramount Chief of Akwapim. But the reader who reads through the Chapter on "Chiefship and the Community" will learn considerably more of the institution of Chiefship and community reactions and relations with the Stool (Throne) than ever I did in my pleasant apprenticeship. The Chapter analyses in depth and demonstrates both from the point of view of the Chief and that of the community.

My one reservation is on the attitude of the very young educated person to Chiefship. I recall very vividly that in the early days of the elections which preceded Independence by some four years, I was busily engaged in the Ahafo area, with a copy of Rattary in one hand and a literacy primer in the other, attempting to get a process known as "mass education" started in the region. We had completed addressing a mass meeting when a young man appeared and presented a document remarkably like a passport which read "Mr. ———— is an accredited representative of the CPP and you are kindly requested to give him every opportunity and assistance with his political work". Faced with this document I felt I had no other option but to allow him to address the meeting. His opening words were on Chiefship. They went something like this: "The Chief is concerned with traditional matters and with our culture. I am an educated man and can thus deal with politics. Politics are for the educated man and not for Chiefs, so in these matters you must be led and guided by me". To my utter astonishment the powerful Chief, who sat on the platform with me, made no protest and, in fact, seemed to agree with the respective roles as designated by the "educated" young man who, at the most, had achieved a primary education. As time went on the influence of the "educated" young man in politics became more evident. There is no doubt in my mind that a large part of the CPP's attitude towards the institution of Chiefship stemmed from the ill-formulated thinking of Nkrumah's "verandah boys", a large number of whom were school drop-outs or unemployed school leavers. Surely a great deal more of this "political tinder", as Tom Mboya called it in another context, is now evident in Ahafo?

The advent of the Christian Missions and their coming to terms with the Fetish is well described. Education figures prominently in the work of the Missions, centred, as the Christian Missions were, on a book religion. The "curse of the Coast" contaminated Ahafo, and the problem of the unemployed schoolboy with his revolution of aspirations became evident at a very early date. It is salutary to reflect that we were faced in the Gold Coast with the problem of the unemployed school leaver emerging as a political problem as early as 1947-48.

Chief, DC, cocoa farmer, cocoa broker, timber merchant, the hunters in the forest, politicians, parade through chapter after chapter as the history of Ahafo unfolds. Their relation with the power system as expressed in political activity is clearly analysed, and again and again the "why?" of things is explained. I doubt very much if those of us who were concerned with development in Ashanti between 1946 and 1957 would have argued our assumptions with such conviction had we then had access to research work of this quality.

One could go on quoting from "Dependence and Opportunity: Political Change in Ahafo", but space and the review reader's patience must be considered. This work is of supreme importance as donor nations move into an aid policy focussed on poverty. Already the great spate of economic analysis and management analysis begins to create the impression that the subsistence farmer is but an empty vessel ready to be filled with the oil of a new knowledge. "Dependence and Opportunity: Political Change in Ahafo" adds a new dimension, and although Ahafo region would not be described as a particularly poverty-stricken region, the book prompts one to think deeply of the human condition and the interweave of economic development, tradition and local political attitudes.

"Dependence and Opportunity: Political Change in Ahafo" is indeed a work of real scholarship which extends the frontiers of knowledge on the development process and will be invaluable to student, planner and administrator.

A. R. G. PROSSER

The Trade Makers: Elder Dempster in West Africa, 1852-1972, by P. N. DAVIES; *George Allen & Unwin*, 1973; 526 pp., including 85 appendices, bibliography and index; £8.50.

For any who travelled to or from West Africa in the days before the airways acquired a near monopoly of passenger traffic, the words "Elder Dempster" will always have a special magic. Successive companies operating the seaborne passenger service used in varying form the names of Alexander Elder and John Dempster, whose own direct connection with the shipping business that they founded ended in 1884, as Dr. Davies shows, after a comparatively brief sixteen years. That service was one of the most important elements in the lives of those who did their "strenuous tour(s) in the humid energy-absorbing climate of West Africa". It was a dramatic element also in the lives of the West Africans who, for study, business or pleasure, made their way in increasing numbers to Liverpool and the wider world to which

it was the gateway. For all of these, Elder Dempster was synonymous with the mutual involvement of Britain and West Africa.

For those concerned with seaborne trade to and from West Africa, for more than a century since 1852, Elder Dempster companies have likewise had a special significance as having at first almost the whole of the trade and latterly the most important share in it.

Like all familiar, essential things, the Elder Dempster services tended to be taken for granted, under-valued and sometimes maligned. A Coaster, reluctantly returning from his leave, might be critical of his passenger-ship; a merchant might be irked with E.D.'s terms for the carriage of his goods; and, as Dr. Davies shows us dispassionately, venturers such as Mr. John Holt (once a youthful worker alongside Alexander Elder and John Dempster in the Liverpool offices of Messrs. Fletcher, Parr & Co.) and Lever Bros. might attribute all sorts of dislikeable features to the Elder Dempster company and its ways; but all would surely agree that there was a romance about the operations so painstakingly set out in this book. "E.D.'s" well merited a history of this quality.

The romance is there in the book; but the general reader must work for it. This is a book of earnest scholarship, the fruit of years of thorough research, a reliable book of reference for anyone concerned to study the development of West Africa's seaborne trade. As well as the eighty-five listed appendices and the bibliography, there is a multitude of tables in the text, each with its authority duly cited. Dr. Davies, who is Lecturer in Economic History in the University of Liverpool, and who has made a special study of British shipping and the growth of the West African economy, has been unsparing in his search for, and attribution to, authoritative sources. He has skilfully manipulated a great mass of material in such a way that his facts and quotations speak for themselves and it is only occasionally that he makes a point through his own argument. His book is a comprehensive statement of all available material for the serious student and, as such, it does not sacrifice accuracy and factuality to mere readibility. The hard fact of a price of £8.50 may also frighten off the general reader. This is a pity for the romance is there; the book is very aptly titled, "The Trade Makers". It shows how both by human response to the daunting physical and geographical conditions of West Africa and by hard-headed practical attention to the requirements of a fiercely-competitive business, the successors of Elder and Dempster were exceptionally important in the development of West African trade and thus of the peoples of the Coast.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, West Africa had a special fascination for the venturesome. A book that ultimately relies so heavily on tables of tonnages employed and the capital that provided them and the profits that were derived from them, nevertheless briefly and skilfully sets the scene for these endeavours. Without any sacrifice of scholarly detachment, Dr. Davies depicts the romance that has, right up to this workaday age, made West Africa something special.

There is, for instance, the romance of Sir Alfred Jones. His "whole world revolved around the West Coast of Africa" (p. 181); and yet he had been

there only once. In 1859, a boy of fourteen, he sailed as a cabin-boy as far as Fernando Po. He never visited West Africa again but it never lost its fascination for him. He was the effective founder of the Elder Dempster companies, of the Wesr African Shipping Conference, of the Bank of British West Africa, and of other vital developments in trade on and with the Coast. He was the clever opponent – and yet, over all, the continuing friend – of John Holt, with whom he and Elder and Dempster had shared humble employment in the Liverpool office of the agents for the African Steam Ship Company. It is the founding of this Company in 1852 that Dr. Davies takes as the point of departure for his story of how The Trade Makers made the trade.

And there is romance, too – albeit of a different kind – in the conflicts that ensued along the way, with John Holt and his successful merchant firm and its own modest fleet, with Lever Bros, and the Niger Company and the United Africa Company that they formed, with merchants dissatisfied with Conference terms and latterly with incoming shipowners from Europe and elsewhere. Dr. Davies does not permit himself purple passages but the vigorous in-fighting that marked some of these conflicts is not hidden by a purely factual recital of the way in which they were conducted, with each reference carefully foot-noted.

The Conference system of regulating shipping and freight charges has caused much controversy. The law-and-order administrations of British West Africa in pre-independence days were not notable for commercial expertise. Periodically Governments sought in an amateurish way to satisfy themselves about the West African Lines Conference. Dr. Davies quietly makes a persuasive case (e.g. pp. 373 and 384) that West Africa has been well served by the system; and he cites authority in support.

No commercial venture that enjoyed a dominant share in a particular trade could escape criticism. Dr. Davies records (p. 377) figures that show that "shipping is not an industry where profits are easily made"; he shows also that Elder Dempster have been, over the years, more successful than the average shipping company. But he shows too the solid contribution that they have made to the mercantile development of West Africa. There is much in their story of which they may properly be proud. In technical matters, they have often been leaders. Their *Lake Champlain* was the first British vessel to be fitted with Marconi's ship-to-shore communication system (p. 347); after the Second World War, they were notable innovators in engine design (p. 354).

Two World Wars brought a sad tale of ships and men lost (twenty-nine ships and 487 men in the First and twenty-four ships and 478 men in the Second); but there is a tale also of very distinguished service by sea-going and shore-based staff. The vital increase in deliveries of West African oils, fats and timber to the United Kingdom in World War Two owed much to Elder Dempster.

Those who have served Elder Dempster can be proud of their service and of the justice done to it in this book; but Dr. Davies does not acquit the companies of occasional over-caution and neglect of opportunity (pp. 377-8), while giving cautious encouragement for the future.

It is doubtless inevitable in a book so full of facts and figures that there should be some minor misprints. The photographs are interesting but not very distinguished and are inserted without seeming relevance to the nearby text. Nor do some of them and their captions do justice to the points they presumably intend. But these are small criticisms of a handsome volume.

Lord Cole, a former Chairman of great concerns that were at times strenuously opposed to Elder Dempster companies, pleasantly praises Dr. Davies's work in a Foreword; and Dr. Davies himself has written an excellent, pithy Introduction to the detailed story that he then unfolds with admirable mastery over his mass of material.

GREY OF NAUNTON

Aid Performance and Development Policies of Western Countries, edited by BRUCE DINWIDDY, *Praeger*, 1973; vii and 139 pp., index; £4.50.

ODI Review 6, edited by BRUCE DINWIDDY, *Overseas Development Institute Ltd., London*, 1973; vi and 118 pp; £1.50.

These two volumes contain successive issues in the Overseas Development Institute's series of annual surveys and evaluations of the developed world's programme in aid of the underdeveloped world. In so far as their assessment is focused on global flows and target results, they relate largely to the years 1970 and 1971 respectively, which are the latest years for which the statistics are available: most of the tables, for example, seek to put the years 1970 and 1971 into the perspective of the 1960s. In so far as they discuss changing policies, trends, attitudes and prospects of international aid they relate mainly to 1971 and 1972.

Each volume contains eight separate articles written mainly but not exclusively by members of the ODI research staff; the end-result is two somewhat mixed bags of broadly similar composition. Both volumes contain a useful compilation and discussion of up-to-date intelligence on recent developments in the international context of aid (bearing, e.g. on commercial and monetary developments and on the discussions and strategies of international aid-giving agencies). Both also contain a detailed critical analysis of the current British programme plus articles on the philosophy, organisation and character of the aid programme of the United States and the Netherlands (in the Praeger volume), and France and Sweden (in *Review* 6). The mixture is topped off in each case by an article on the implications for developing countries of the enlarged E.E.C., an introductory essay, and some concluding general reflections by Guy Hunter. The Praeger volume is dignified by an index – but so was *Review* 5 of which it is merely the hard-back version published a year later.

The ODI is a non-governmental spokesman for the aid lobby: its objects are to conduct research, to promote the exchange of views and information and to publicise the urgency of action in the aid field. Its research officers, though they tend to write in polemical vein, are well-informed about the realities of the development process and display a refreshing freedom from the moralising and the double-think which so often characterises official

pronouncements (national or international) on this topic. Nevertheless, the impact of publications such as these is blunted by their failure to develop a common analytical framework of discussion or a clear definition of either the problems or objectives of research or of the priorities for action. For example, in spite of some well-aimed criticism and a general scepticism concerning the conventional indicators of progress in this field (e.g. measures of GNP growth for recipients, aid as a percentage of GNP for donors or simply gross flows of private or official aid) much of the discussion and most of the statistical material seems to be predicated on just this kind of misleading statistic. Or again, it is not enough to make the point that the "quality" of aid is more important than the "quantity" of aid, or that development is a process of social transformation which depends as much on the policies of aid recipients as on donors' policies. What is needed is a systematic attempt to define the objectives and identify the characteristics of an effective aid policy.

The trouble is, of course, that "aid" is all things to all people. It may be an aspect of foreign policy, or a poverty programme, or a programme in "co-operative" development or a cultural crusade (a "*besoin de rayonnement*") or a mixture of all these things. It is to the politician's interest to keep these goals fluid and the officials are accordingly forced to compromise. No one would suppose that it is a simple task to define the elements of an efficient aid policy, but it ought to be easier for an independent agency, without disciplinary or ideological or political constraints, to clarify the conflicts in objectives and to analyse the costs and benefits of specific kinds of action.

PHYLLIS DEANE

Trade Strategies for Development: Papers on the Ninth Cambridge Conference on Development Problems; CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY OVERSEAS STUDIES COMMITTEE, Ed. PAUL STREETEN; *Macmillan;* appendices and index; pp. 375; £8.00.

It would have been most fitting if this review could have been carried in the 25th Anniversary Number of the Journal so that it might be read in conjunction with the articles in that issue by Professor Ronald Robinson and the Vice Chancellor of the University of Tasmania which reveal the part played both by the Cambridge Conferences and the Journal in promoting the exchange of views and practices between the administrations of what were once colonial territories and the mother country. The exchanges were initially between expatriates abroad and their colleagues at home but as time went by participation broadened into a dialogue between administrators and academics irrespective of their status in Britain or in their own countries on matters not only of particular concern within the Commonwealth but more generally on issues of world-wide concern during the first Development Decade. Now the wheel has come full circle as far as the Conferences are concerned (although happily not the Journal). The Ninth Conference was the last of its kind although it will surely not be the last time that Cambridge will be the scene of future meetings of minds amongst

those concerned with overseas development. Perhaps it was time for this series to take a final curtain. Appendix III being the list of Conference Members shows an overwhelming preponderance of participants from Britain and other developed countries or institutions. The early "pioneers"* would regret the presence of only four participants from two countries in West Africa and none at all from East Africa when it was largely for the benefit of Africa as a whole that the Conferences (and the Journal) were initiated.

Leaving nostalgia on one side there can be no doubt that the theme or themes for the Ninth Conference could scarcely be more relevant and for this reason it is to be hoped that the collected volume of addresses and the stimulating introduction by the Editor, Paul Streeten, who was Chairman of the Conference will find its way to a wider and much more diverse audience. The reviewer is not an economist and may therefore be excused from attempting to summarise the contents. He is content to note with the Editor that "the process of development has at least one problem to every solution" and that it was a distinguished economist Professor Dennis Robertson quoted by Mr. I. G. Patel in his Introductory Address who felt sufficiently sure of his ground to describe the policy of discrimination in favour of British goods in the colonial empire as not only "indifferent economics" but also "bad morals and shocking diplomacy". Since it is a widely-held view that overseas development is a mix of economics, altruism and politics it is gratifying to read in this volume that the same mix is abundantly evident in considering Trade Strategies for Development even though this gratification must be tempered by recognising that self-interest is all too often the primary economic, political and sadly moral outlook of many governments and people. The dissensus drawn out by the Editor in his Introduction does nevertheless make for realism in absorbing the lessons of this Ninth and final Cambridge Conference.

While this volume was in the course of preparation for publication we have witnessed a traumatic convulsion in the balance of world trade and before this review appears we shall be seeing the outcomes rather more clearly. All that we can safely say at the time of writing is that the repercussions on trade are most immediately damaging to developing countries and if the Conference had been aware of what was in store its final plenary session might still be continuing in the School of Pythagoras.

L. W. NORWOOD

Panchayati Raj Administration, by V. P. GROVER and Associates: *Lakshmi Narain Agarwal, Agra,* 1973; 215 pp.; Rs. 25.00.

This is a report of field research conducted as part of a larger study, published by the Indian Institute of Public Administration (*Panchayati Raj Administration: Old Control and New Challenges,* 1970), of local government

*See article by A. H. M. Kirk-Greene in *Journal of Administration Overseas* on on "Administration and Africanisation" pages 259 - 268.

administration in Madras, Maharashtra and Rajasthan. It is another in a long and impressive list of publications which have emerged out of work sponsored or commissioned by the Administrative Reforms Commission of the Government of India. This one was carried out under the direction of the Department of Political Science, University of Rajasthan.

The focus of inquiry is narrow, sharp and clear. It is state and local supervision and control, both administrative and technical, of *panchayati raj* institutions at village, block and district levels in Rajasthan. As expected, the details of formal powers set down in relevant legislation and standing orders are described. Unexpectedly, and a large bonus for students of local government administration in India, an analysis is made of inspection notes recorded by supervisory personnel during their tours, of audit reports, and of the conduct of such personnel at formal meetings of local government bodies like the *panchayati samiti*. The contents of inspection notes and audit reports are analysed, in part, in terms of whether or not observations and suggestions contained in them were subsequently followed up by administrative action. The conduct of meetings is examined in terms of the ability of administrative personnel to provide leadership. The focus is explicitly on administrators, and wider political considerations are not built into the analysis.

The venue for the field researches was two blocks in Ajmer District. (There are more than 230 blocks in Rajasthan). Anyone interested in local government administration or community development who has had the good fortune to tour in Rajasthan will recognise immediately the names of the two blocks chosen for study in this book. They are Srinagar and Kekri, show-spots that regularly appear on tour programmes drawn up by the State government. The author and his associates are critical of what they saw in Srinagar and Kekri, and conclude their useful study by suggesting rather sweeping reforms. Yet if supervision and control in Srinagar and Kekri are as inadequate as they suggest, then local government administration in the rest of the state must be very poor indeed.

DAVID C. POTTER

Applied Measures for Promoting Technological Growth, by STANLEY A. HETZLER; *Routledge and Kegan Paul* (*International Library of Sociology*), *London and Boston;* xiii, pp. 337; £5.00.

A reader determined to discover what Professor Hetzler is about in this manual for technological growth will be obliged to study an earlier work, "*Technological Growth and Social Change – Achieving Modernisation*" (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1969), to which the present study is a sequel. Professor Hetzler has a pellucid vision of what constitutes proper development and, unlike other luminaries for whom he has some justifiable scorn, he has a programme to tell us how it should be achieved. The Open Sesame here is *socio-technics*, the writer's personal gift to an already cluttered lexicon of development. Presented as both a science and a creed, the notion is unbalanced: very much more *technic* than *socio*. This may reflect the pro-

clivities of one who, although ostensibly a professional sociologist, is also co-author of a computer training manual*.

As a runner in a field which has attracted a number of would-be polymaths, Professor Hetzler's stamina is not noticeably greater in sociology than it is in many of the other disciplines through which he makes critical detours. To an anthropologist, the three pages of derivative comment allocated to his subject do little to warm him to Professor Hetzler's theme. The virtue of *socio-techniques*, we are assured, is its strategic simplicity. It (they?) is unfolded in the earlier volume, and partially in this volume, as an evolutionist/historicist notion redolent of Parsonian modernisation. At the heart of Professor Hetzler's work is the conviction that the development panacea may be found in the study of the relationship between man and machine, and the conclusion that "every development project must contribute as directly as possible to indoctrinating the society in power technology" (Hetzler 1969, p. 192). His evolutionist confidence in unilinear patterns of human progress enables him to prescribe his fundamental programme for technological growth with little regard for circumstances of time or place. Pronouncedly capitalist (although contrarily critical of capitalist interests from time to time) *socio-technics* is placed in ideological contrast with Marxism as a vector for social change.

Professor Hetzler appears to envisage successful development as the adjustment of society to the comely contours of "a well-rounded technology" (p. 9). His formulae seek to promote a society of technical innovators by way of "indoctrination in power technology" (p. 92); the logical equanimity with which these ends are pursued is sometimes doubtful (cf. "The notions that development begins with indoctrination . . . are naive ones" (p. 65) and at times the political contexts of his propositions are strikingly naive.

Reasonably enough, administrative structures are the media for Professor Hetzler's programme, and it is perhaps in this that the main interest of the book for readers of this Journal will rest. For a country which *wants* the kind of growth he advocates, and which does not know how to set about getting it, this book could offer some helpful organisational ideas. As a more general development medicine, however, its conceptual chemistry does not inspire much confidence. Moreover, as a philosophy its expression is strangely repulsive. However prescient it may ultimately appear, *socio-technics* does not have anything very inspiring to say about human morality or human contentment.

A. F. ROBERTSON

Teaching in Public Administration; by RICHARD A. CHAPMAN; A REPORT FOR THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE OF THE JOINT UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR SOCIAL AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION; *the Joint University Council for Social and Public Administration;* pp. 95; £1.00.

In January 1972 the Public Administration Committee of the Joint University Council for Social and Public Administration decided to sponsor an enquiry with the following terms of reference:

* Roger Nett and Stanley A. Hetzler, *An Introduction to Electronic Data Processing Systems;* Macmillan, New York 1959.

"To consider public administration teaching and research in Britain, survey the work being done in Universities and polytechnics and, where relevant, in Business Schools and other institutions concerned with post-experience courses; and to make recommendations for future developments."

The enquiry, which was financed by a very modest grant of £500 from the Social Science Research Council, was undertaken by Dr. Chapman who has produced a report which not only provides for the first time a wide range of detailed information on the teaching of public administration in Britain, but also draws attention to a number of specific aspects of this subject which will be of interest to all those concerned with training for public administration in the widest sense.

The Report suggests that there should be a substantial investment of funds to develop University teaching capacity in the subject of public administration, and the Civil Service comes in for a number of criticisms based on its lack of desire to assist in achieving this objective. The report establishes that there is a gap, at present unfilled by the facilities offered by Universities in this subject, but it does not make clear what incentive there would be for the Civil Service to invest further funds – over and above the costs of the three existing Civil Service Colleges – towards the development of public administration as an academic subject. On the face of it, the question of whether or not additional funds ought to be made available for developments in this field is primarily a matter for the University Grants Committee and individual Universities.

In dealing with public administration teaching staff the point is made that, contrary to common belief, almost half of those thus engaged have worked in the public service at some stage or other in their careers, and most of those who spend more than 50 per cent of their teaching time on public administration have been civil servants, local government officers or have been seconded to one of the Civil Service Colleges. Referring to the subsequent careers of students who have taken public administration courses the report notes that data is limited, but that out of 44 students who took the public administration course over the period 1967-72 at Hull University, only six made the public service their career. Again, of the first 14 graduates in public administration from Sheffield Polytechnic, eight took up appointments with local authorities, while the rest followed careers outside the public sector. The comment here is that the pattern revealed by these figures is not surprising in view of the lack of official encouragement from the Civil Service. It is a pity that the report does not enlarge on what kind of encouragement might have altered this situation.

The report refers to the demand for the services of University teachers in public administration to assist at the Civil Service College, and at the residential courses run by the NALGO[1] which between them utilise approximately 600 teaching hours per annum. Dr. Chapman suggests that more University-level public administration teaching may be conducted by University lecturers outside than is actually taught within the Universities

[1]National and Local Government Officers' Association.

themselves. He concludes that the limit to the demands for this kind of teaching assistance has already been reached, and having examined the reasons which led to such extensive outside help being given, Dr. Chapman notes with regret that there is no evidence of officers from the Civil Service being seconded to teach in the universities.

On the question of research topics registered for higher degrees, it is recorded that out of 103 projects listed when the report was drafted, 46 were in the subject area of local and regional government, but none were undertaken in the field of central government. Dr. Chapman suggests that the main reason for this state of affairs is the greater ease of access to research materials and files in local government, together with the greater availability of assistance, especially financial, to work on local government topics. Nor does he believe that this situation will change as long as the Civil Service takes the view that public administration academics work on material that is of little practical use to civil servants, and yet at the same time, is reluctant to afford opportunities to academics to do research on practical problems in the area of central government. There is also unfavourable comment on the attitude of the Civil Service in regard to providing facilities for civil servants to undertake higher studies.

The Civil Service College at Sunningdale is examined in some detail, but the overall picture presented of central government training is rather unbalanced since the report, by reason of its terms of reference, necessarily ignores the considerable volume of specialised training carried out within Ministries, and at the Civil Service College in London. Training activities in the local government field receive favourable comment, although no reference is made to the fact that the absence of centralised training facilities for local authority staff necessitates the use of written examinations as a means of implementing staff development. The report does not attempt to show that such training is necessarily more effective than the job-oriented training provided in the Civil Service.

The Civil Service also makes a poor showing in the section of the report which deals with the Royal Institute of Public Administration. The size of the central government grant to the Institute is compared unfavourably with the financial assistance provided for the British Institute of Management. Given the costs of maintaining three Civil Service Colleges, and the extensive system of in-service training within central government, the report can hardly be said to make a convincing case for further financial assistance from central government to enable an outside organisation to conduct seminars and other activities which the Civil Service College could undertake.

With regard to the role of the DES in relation to National Certificate and Diploma courses in public administration, attention is drawn to the scale of investment in management studies which took place during the 1960s, but surely the point is that this investment was intended to fill a palpable gap, at that time, in training facilities for the private sector? It is not demonstrated in the report that there is a pressing demand for a similar development of training facilities in public administration. Dr. Chapman notes, with some surprise, that the Civil Service College "seems to be doing rather well for

applicants though it was established without a preliminary assessment of likely demand". Since the College was set up to provide particular types of training identified by the Civil Service as being needed for staff development purposes it is surely hardly surprising that the College has not suffered from a lack of trainees being put forward by Ministries in pursuance of their own staff development programmes.

In reviewing the activities of the Institute of Local Government Studies at the University of Birmingham, attention is drawn to the four month courses which are specially mounted there for participants from overseas. These courses are financially guaranteed by the Overseas Development Administration which also finances about half the overseas study fellows who attend the Diploma Course offered each year by the ILGS. This reference to facilities provided for overseas students leads one to regret that the report contains no mention of the training facilities in public administration for personnel from overseas provided at a number of other Universities in Britain such as the Cambridge Course on Development, the Department of Overseas Administrative Studies in Manchester, and the Diploma Courses at Leeds and Swansea to name but a few. Nor is any reference made to the growing activity of the Royal Institute of Public Administration in providing training in different aspects of administration for overseas participants.

An interesting insight into the way in which administrative linkages function amongst British Universities is provided when the report deals with University and Educational administration and the apparent disregard for the Joint University Council is accounted for by the fact that:

> "it goes against the traditions of Universities not to send senior people as their representatives on outside bodies, but the Public Administration Committee has in recent years specifically requested that Universities should appoint as their representatives, members of staff concerned with teaching of the subject, rather than heads of politics departments."

In the concluding chapter Dr. Chapman puts forward two interesting recommendations. The first, that Central Government should endow a Chair and small Department of Public Administration located within a University, but with specific responsibilities to liaise with the Civil Service College. Secondly, that a Public Policy and Administration Unit should be set up, possibly within the RIPA, to act as a "think-tank" to stimulate ideas, and focus attention on the more logical planning of policy programmes. Dr. Chapman is under no illusion as to the difficulties of implementing his proposals, and he is probably right to doubt whether anything concrete will emerge from either of his suggestions in the short term. Nevertheless, the fact that these ideas have been put forward may perhaps stimulate the Joint University Council for Social and Public Administration to attempt to resolve the present conflict in regard to the recognition of public administration as an academic subject in Britain. A conflict due partly to the Universities paying scant regard to a subject which is not accepted as a discipline in the traditional sense; and partly to the Civil Service not regarding academic qualifications in public administration as a prerequisite for a person proposing to enter the public service as a career.

I.T.N.

Book Notes

Manual of Tropical Housing and Building, Part 1, Climatic Design, by O. H. KOENIGSBERGER, T. G. INGERSOLL, ALAN MAYHEW and S. V. SZOKOLAY; *Longman, London;* bibliography, appendices, index; pp. 320; £2.95 (Paperback).

Dr. Koenigsberger in his Preface aptly describes this book as "intended as a text-book for students, as a reference book for practitioners, and as an aid for their clients – investors, administrators and politicians".

With few exceptions, traditional housing in most of the tropics has been developed to meet the needs of a mainly rural population; "Everybody is a house builder as much as he is a cultivator or herdsman . . . monetary transactions are minimal . . . the assistance of relations, friends and neighbours is rewarded by food. drink and mutual help". The safe storage of crops receives as much attention as shelter for the family. Man has learnt to provide adequate, if very simple, rural shelter by traditional methods usually ill-suited to the urban environment; and so with urban growth a major phenomenon of frightening size, urban housing provides the most pressing tropical housing need. An admirable introduction is followed by sections on climate, comfort, thermal design and control of light and lighting, noise and noise control, types of shelter for different climatic conditions, and design aids.

This should prove an invaluable handbook for those actively concerned with the development of urban areas in the developing world, for planners and builders of housing that is relevant to the local environment and which is realistically within the scope of the limited resources available in most of the Third World to public bodies and to the private and informal sectors.

Aid and Self-Help, by ELIZABETH O'KELLY; *Charles Knight,* 1973; photographs. appendix; pp. 140; £2.50.

The book is directed at those who plan to engage in rural development work overseas, particularly volunteers, and to the general public who rely mostly on the mass media for knowledge about developing countries.

In Part One, the author explains the real priorities in case of "natural" and "man-made" disasters, and points out the way in which false assumptions about what is needed and how relief should be conducted, can underly difficulties in relief work.

In Part Two, the author fills in the background to these disasters by describing the less widely publicised day to day conditions which pertain in developing countries, and which call for long-term investment of resources. Here, attention is drawn to a common failure to link aid with the promotion of self-help in the community concerned.

The book concludes with a detailed case study of a self-help programme conducted in a rural community in the Cameroons. The vicissitudes of the various projects are traced through a critical period in the country's history prior to Independence. The account illustrates the ways in which factors inside and outside a community can influence the outcome of a rural development programme.

Those with direct experience of development work may take issue with a few of the generalisations and conclusions, which appear to be rather sweeping. But these are largely matters of degree. The book is recommended for its attempt to present clearly and simply the realistic needs and legitimate interests and values of countries receiving aid, as well as for drawing attention to the complexity of relief work in an emergency, and of long-term development in the rural areas of low income countries.

Research Report No. 15 – An Evaluation of Kenya Science Teachers: College, Phase II 1970-72, by OLGA LINNE; *The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Sweden.*

This is the second of three studies by Dr. Linne. It is intimidatingly sub-titled "A longtitudinal sociological – pedagogical Evaluation".

The main purpose of the exercise is to determine whether the KST College (sponsored by the Swedish International Development Authority – SIDA) is meeting the objectives set for it by the Kenya Government. In addition a number of other questions concerning attitudes generated or changed by study in College are posed and answered. Diverse "instruments" of measurement are used to obtain answers. Some are simply the use of available records or replies to a questionnaire, others include a mysterious "attitude scale" devised by the author.

The approach is a somewhat clinical one, but any real benefit gained from an evaluation study of this type must be open to question. Does it, one wonders, really need the paraphernalia of a research project to discover that a third year student has acquired more general knowledge than he possessed in year one? Would not most students or teachers for that matter, have gained in general knowledge during three years at school, college, or on a campus?

The views of students about their training can of course be useful. Of much greater value would be their assessment *after* a period of post-college in-school teaching.

Report 15 will not prove as helpful to the Kenyan authorities and others, as Report 10, by the same author and noted in these columns in the January Number of 1973.

Europe's Chosen Few – Policy and Practice of the EEC Aid Programme, by DAVID JONES; *Overseas Development Institute, London;* tables; pp. 99; £1.00.

The title of this ODI review reflects the limited field of former dependencies of EEC nations which attract community aid.

David Jones concentrates his study on the actual aid provided by EEC and how it operates rather than on the legal form by which the aid is underwritten.

With the accession to Europe of Britain and Denmark, the independent countries of Africa, the West Indies, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific were given the prospect of Association with the Community either by participating in the convention to succeed that of Yaounde, when it expires at the end of January 1975, or by a special convention of association, or by concluding a trade agreement.

The Associable Commonwealth States have been wary, suspicious of the motives of former Colonial powers in offering an association. As David Jones points out, complete equality between rich and poor, between donor and recipient, is impossible, but in practice association reduces policy-making freedom to a very limited extent and Association is a voluntary arrangement.

The Associables, no doubt, do not take over-kindly to the feeling that they are being compelled to associate for fear of trade disadvantages should they stay outside. Certainly solidarity in non-association would leave the associables in a strong moral position *vis à vis* the trade "penalties" for exclusion, and the advantages are certainly not one-way only; expanding trade offers economic growth opportunities to EEC States as well as to associables.

Besides providing a clear picture of the background and of the issues involved in participation, David Jones explains exactly how the system operates at present and the types of aid that EEC is able to provide. The information is backed by four lucidly-compiled tables.

This timely publication is in the best traditions of ODI paperbacks on Aid. It provides policy makers in associable states with valuable guidelines and it certainly helps the general reader to understand the basis for community aid and the options open to the newly-eligible states.

Chronology of African History, by G. S. P. FREEMAN-GRENVILLE; *Oxford University Press;* index; pp. 312; £5.00.

From 1000 BC to 1971, Dr. Freeman-Grenville presents a unique panoramic chronology of Africa, which has been excellently produced by OUP – albeit one regrets the absence of a map. On the basis that African history began with Heroditus, an arbitary start is made. By page 80 we have reached 1500 AD and Vasco de Gama has rounded Cape of Good Hope. By 1535 one notes that the Portuguese have already started to build at Tete. From now on the pages are fuller.

The method adopted is for each double page to provide six columns for events in (*a*) Egypt and the Sudan, (*b*) Northern Africa, (*c*) Western Africa, (*d*) Eastern Africa, (*e*) Central and Southern Africa and (*f*) "Other Countries" (major world events). From 1800 onwards North Africa merges into column (*a*) and is replaced in column (*b*) by Central Africa, column (*e*) becoming "Southern" only. From 1000 BC to 1276 AD Africa is divided into three columns on a single page, each with a fourth column for "Other Countries".

The system works admirably – at a glance one obtains an often intriguing picture of comparative history right across the African Continent, with major (sometimes rather minor) contemporary world events to catch the eye as well. Teachers, students in particular, but all whose interest lies in Africa will find £5 well spent on adding this chronology to their shelves. It should help many of those who concentrate on the Continent's more recent exciting events and the immediate Colonial past, to see Africa in her proper historical perspective.

Report of the Director-General – The Ratification of International Labour Conventions in Africa; *ILO, Geneva,* 1973; pp. 61; 12.50 (Swiss Francs).

This is an interesting report and well presented. One notes that only 10 African States have been able to ratify the Employment Policy Convention. The Forced Labour Convention has been widely ratified; how far legislation compelling, for example, graduates into employment as directed by the State or where pressure ends and compulsion begins in, say, resettlement, is no doubt a moot point.

Twenty-five States have ratified the Social Policy Convention and the same number the Labour Inspection Convention. The Report is rather more a well set out factual account of the *status quo* (on information provided by national governments or in existing legislation), than an assessment of the extent to which in reality the several conventions are being successfully implemented.

Rather as if providing cover for the accepted ILO HQ view, there is frequent reference to "the committee of experts" as if they formed a special infallible body. Their views are of course open to as much questioning and examination as those of any who propound a particular viewpoint.

Occasional Paper 73/1 **Alternative Local Organisational Policies in Development,** by ZDRAVKO MLINAR, HENRY TEUNE and JERZY J. WIATR.

Occasional Paper 73/3 **Administration and Development – Choice within limits,** by EUGEN PUSIC.

Occasional Paper 73/4 **Alternatives, Administration and Development,** by FRED W. RIGGS.

Occasional Paper 73/6 **The Concept of Development: Theory and Policy,** by HENRY TEUNE and ZDRAVKO MLINAR.

Published by the *Vienna Institute for Development.*

Paper 73/1 discusses in general terms, variations to the extent local government can operate autonomously in the present era, and poses questions that arise therefrom, Paper 73/3 reads rather like the staccato jottings of a notebook with some code

language thrown in. There is a strange reference to Lord Nelson whose immortal Trafalgar signal the author seems to have misunderstood. In Paper 73/4 Fred Riggs continues his well-known examination of transitional and traditional societies. In particular he draws attention to the new confrontation pattern emerging in several countries between the established government and radical movements demanding change (strangely referred to as local collectivities). He appears to be advocating popular participation at the local level of government with the central government persuaded to accord a reasonable measure of autonomy.

Paper 73/6 provides a general theoretical definition of development as "integrated diversity" and places the focus on development targets.

These papers are short and are intended to stimulate criticism and discussion. They are academic and theoretical in content – no doubt at a later stage, not too late one hopes, how best to put theory into practice will be discussed.

Critical Appraisal of the Chilean Agrarian Reform, by SOLON BARACLOUGH and ALMINO AFFONSO; *Vienna Institute for Development;* pp. 80.

The Vienna Institute's occasional paper 73/12 covers a 20 month period from November 1970 until June 1972 – the period in which the new government of President Allende was carrying out an extensive policy of land reform.

The authors explain that Chile with a mainly urban but under-industrialised society is not self-sufficient in food production and must import if the people are to have enough to eat. With rising consumer demand and rising prices for imports coinciding with a fall in the world copper price, as the authors clearly saw, a radical government which cannot provide food at a reasonable price to the poorer elements of society upon which it depends for support, must inevitably face a major political crisis.

This study provides a detailed and balanced appraisal of the reforms being undertaken. To what extent, if any, there was time for an attempt to be made to follow up the suggestions for improving farming methods and management which are set out; or whether the suggestions made would have had a fair chance of success in the long term, cannot now be assessed. But there is material in this study which could prove of value to the new government of Chile when it faces up to the problems of increased agricultural production.

South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970, by JAMES BARBER; *Oxford University Press;* tables, illustrations, bibliography and index; pp. 325; £4.50.

Dr. Barber's story opens with Smuts in power and the Afrikaaner nationalists (including a not inconsiderable element that had been pro Hitler's Germany in the late war) in opposition. The 1948 elections brought Dr. Malan and his Nationalists to office with a small majority of seats and a minority of votes – a position that subsequent elections steadily strengthened.

The story carries on to Harold Macmillan's notable "winds of change" speech to the startled and angered South African House of Assembly which he was addressing, on again to the ever-increasing isolation that world distaste for the Nationalist party policy of apartheid has evoked; on to the attempt by Vorster to reach a *modus vivendi* with Independent African States and his very limited success in this field; on to the boycotts and the expulsion from sporting and international agencies which continued extreme racialism has caused. While the South African government has made a few compromises by and large its racial supremacist policies have not changed – since Smuts fell from office such liberal lamps as may have been burning low have been largely snuffed out.

Industrial Decentralisation in South Africa, by TREVOR BELL; *Oxford University Press;* tables and index; 304 pp.; £6.50.

What we have here is a calm, dispassionate account of the way in which the South African Government, faced with the uncomfortable implications for the white minority of fully-applied "separate development" theories, elected not to industrialise that 13 per cent of the country allocated to the black majority, and chose instead to locate industry – or rather, encouraged industrialists to locate their factories – in "white areas" contiguous with "black areas", from which cheap labour could be drawn.

Mr. Bell reminds us that the Tomlinson Commission Report of 1956 made recommendations which were aimed at developing the African "Reserves" to an extent that would enable them to accommodate 70 per cent of the African population by the end of the century. Such a policy if sincerely implemented, would of course, have resulted in the progressive withdrawal from the rest of the country of the African labour on which white South Africa depends. The point is also made that any alternative suggestion of raising the level of agriculture in the "Bantustans" by introducing profitable cash crops such as cocoa or large-scale fruit growing inevitably brings loud protests from white farmers who fear competition, or who see themselves being priced out of the market.

Leaving racial considerations aside, the attempts made in South Africa to decentralise industry have a certain affinity with the policy in the United Kingdom of encouraging the location of suitable industries in "grey" areas, and on the surface, would appear to be just as laudable. But, of course, racial considerations can rarely be left aside in South Africa. Bringing industry to "the people" is not intended to save the African from the discomfort and expense of commuting to and from a job in the city, often from many miles away. As Mr. Bell sees it:

"The chief benefit which the Government – and hence the electorate – derive is the gratification of a political desire to bring about racial separation . . . Because of the non-economic value attached to border areas industrialisation, the Government is prepared to sacrifice a certain amount of real product as the necessary price of greater political security."

According to the author, though, a high rate of economic growth is not incompatible with "separate development" as long as this policy is simply taken to mean fostering growth in the border and Bantu areas. If, however, it is used just as a cover by the Government for a policy of reducing the black-white population ratio to 1:1 in the industrial complex of the southern Transvaal, or to curtail the expansion of the African industrial labour force in that region, the compatibility of rapid economic growth with separate development is much more doubtful.

Mr. Bell's conclusion is that very much more study is needed to determine the objectives of the industrialisation policy and to establish what their true cost is likely to be. One must agree with him, too, when he states that those who claim that the only alternative to large-scale decentralisation is political catastrophe, are presenting an extremely gloomy view of South Africa's future, inevitably so as many will feel.

Southern Africa – UN/OAU Conference; Ed. OLAG STOKKE and CARL WIDSTRAND; *Scandinavian Institute of African Studies;* Vol 1 Programme of Action and Conference Proceedings, pp. 275; Skr. 30. Vol. 2 Papers and Documents; pp. 346; Skr. 40.

These two volumes contain a report on the proceedings and the papers presented at an UN/OAU Conference on Colonialism and Apartheid in Southern Africa, which was held in Oslo in April 1973. Fifty-four countries were represented together with 9 independence movements, 16 individual participants, as well as the UN, OAU, UNESCO, ILO, FAO, WHO, UNICEF, UNHCR, the ANC of Zimbabwe and the Commonwealth Secretariat. No less than 127 Resolutions were adopted, mostly of a radical nature with the emphasis on open confrontation with the governments of South Africa, Rhodesia and the East and West African dependencies of Portugal. Violent opposition within and boycotts, etc., without these countries were urged. The outside world was asked to provide not only humanitarian assistance but also material and financial support for the armed struggle of the liberation movements. As Mr. Ole Algard of Norway observes in the preface, "not all the ideas which emerged

from the conference may be politically viable". But the conference certainly asserted the strength of a wide cross section international public opinion in its abhorrence of apartheid in Southern Africa.

Centre-State Relations in Agricultural Development, by S. P. SINGH; *Vikas Publishing House PVT Ltd., Delhi;* tables, bibliography and index; pp. 377.

The theme running through Mr. Singh's study, which stretches over the years 1952-71, is the difficulty of defining absolutely the respective powers of Central and State Governments in domestic matters.

Mr. Singh applies himself to the problem of disputed lines of demarcation as they affect agriculture in India, consequent on the changes brought about in the industry by technological improvements, but he inclines to the view that economic viability rather than legal niceties ought to determine the extent of State or Central Government predominance in this – or, for that matter, any other – area of administration.

He instances a number of cases of State and Centre co-operation, exemplified by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research Projects, to name just one, but points out that persistent food scarcities and foreign exchange stringencies compel the Central Government to play an increasingly bigger part in such State plans as, for instance, that for stepping up agricultural output. Central Government intervention is needed, too, in encouraging States with surpluses to accept the principle of sharing their surplus foodstuffs with States suffering a deficit, and this blurring of the lines of demarcation is accepted with little complaint only when the same political party is in power both at the centre and in the states.

Mr. Singh reckons that most of the problems in this field of Central/State Government relations are due to the failure to distinguish between the areas of national authority and local action, and that this failure comes about because the levels at which decisions should be taken often bear no relation to the issues to be decided. This should depend on whether the problem is clearly of a general or specific nature, but even where a matter of national importance is involved, experiences borrowed from a lower level of administration might be more relevant in helping to deal with it.

Although Mr. Singh's subject will be mainly of interest to the specialist reader, his theme is of universal application, seeing that local and national governments, everywhere, in their very endeavours to co-operate, can rarely avoid overlapping.

Commitment My Style – Career in the Indian Civil Service, by E. N. MANGAT RAI; *Vikas Publishing House, Delhi;* index; pp. 275.

Following N. B. Bonarjee's somewhat disillusioned "under Two Masters" and Nari Rustomji's delightful "Enchanted Frontiers", comes a third personal story by an able Indian administrator whose career straddled the last years of the Raj and the early years of Congress rule. Like his colleagues, Mangat Rai writes well if at times a little waspishly, and where he confines himself to factual episodes such as his account of the grim days following partition of the Punjab, he is at his best. An otherwise very readable book is unfortunately spoilt by an excessive smugness and self-conceit: a capable administrator who has done his job well and who has climbed high up the testing hierarchial ladder of the Indian Civil Service, should not need to delve so often into the collection of favourable comments and remarks which he has carefully stored away. "Hasn't he done well?" – to quote Bruce Forsyth, makes tiresome reading when constantly reiterated.

Banda, by PHILIP SHORT; *Routledge and Kegan Paul,* 1974; index, notes; pp. 357; £3.50.

The baffling paradoxes which surround the behaviour of the Life President of Malawi naturally present a problem to those not closely acquainted with his personal background and the long path he has followed – although it appears dramatically short

to the world in general – in his ascent to his present lonely eminence of power. Philip Short knows his subject and has done his homework thoroughly. In a clear readable style he provides, not only a well-balanced description of the long years of preparation, but also an objective description of the way in which Dr. Banda reacted to the various pressures which led to the Nyasaland state of emergency in 1959, to the attainment of independence for Malawi in 1964, and to the cabinet crisis in the same year.

Providing a backcloth to the story is the history of the ill-fated Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland vainly brought into existence too late in time to stem the rising ride of nationalism in Malawi and Zambia.

In the latter part of his book the author expounds convincingly the contradictions in Dr. Banda's thinking which explain his quarrels with the Organisation of African Unity, his co-operation with the Portuguese in Mozambique, his disagreements with neighbouring Zambia and Tanzania, and last but not least his policy of co-existence with the Republic of South Africa which has led to South African funds being provided to finance his new capital in Lilongwe, and the building of the Nacala rail link to the Indian Ocean through the Portuguese territory of Mozambique.

This book is essential reading for all those who want to try and understand the recent history of Malawi and what is going on there today.

Local Government in Ireland, by P. J. MEGHEN – revised by D. ROCHE; *Institute of Public Administration, Dublin;* pp. 23; 23 pence.

This is the fourth edition of the late Paddy Meghen's short and explicit guide to local government in the Irish Republic, and which Mr. Roche recently revised.

Eire has 27 County Councils (two for Tipperary) and four City Councils ranking as administrative counties. In addition there are 84 town authorities, with the county managers acting not only for their own counties but also for all other local authorities in their area. The pamphlet includes brief particulars of the more important other local bodies on most of which local authorities are represented. There is a chapter on how to become a Council Member (a candidate may nominate himself – a deposit is required and this can be lost). Information is provided on council meetings, functions, services, work organisation, finance and rating. The data is remarkably well set out in so few pages, but one would like to see the next edition provide a little more detailed information as to the actual structure of the Irish local government system.

The Grundrisse – Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy; Gen. Ed. QUINTIN HOARE; Introduced and translated by MARTIN NICOLAUS; *Penguin Books,* 1973; pp. 898; £1.00.

This Pelican book contains a translation of seven of Marx's notebooks which came to light in 1923 and have not previously been translated into English.

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